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The new Articles Three and Four' of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code2 purport to envision a proportional sharing of
responsibility between a negligent bank and its negligent
customer for losses caused by forged or altered checks.3 In
1. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted revised Article Three and the conforming and
miscellaneous amendments to Articles One and Four of the Uniform Commercial Code
in 1990. U.C.C., 2 U.L.A. 5 (1991). Revised Articles Three and Four have been enacted,
sometimes with slight alterations, in 20 states. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-3-101 to 4-3-605,
4-4-101 to 4-4-504 (Michie 1991); CAL. COM. CODE §§ 3-101 to 3-605,4-106 to 4-504 (West
Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42a-3-101 to 42a-3-605, 42a-4-101 to 42a-4-504
(West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. chs. 673.1011 to 673.6051, 674.101 to 674.504
(Harrison Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 490:3-101 to 490:3-605, 490:4-101 to
490:4-504 (Michie 1991); Commercial Law-Negotiable Intruments and Bank Deposits
and Collections, Public Act 87-1135, 1992 111. Legis. Serv. 2693 (West); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 84-3-101 to 84-3-605,84-4-101 to 84-4-504 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-101
to 3-605,4-101 to 4-504 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 336.3-101 to 336.3-605,
336.4-101 to 336.4-504 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-3-101 to 75-3-605, 75-4-
101 to 75-4-504 (Supp. 1992); Uniform Commercial Code, S.B. No. 448, 1992 Mo. Legis.
Serv. 911 (Vernon); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-101 to 30-3-607, 30-4-101 to 30-4-504 (1992);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 3-101 to 3-605, 4-101 to 4-504 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-3-101
to 55-3-605, 55-4-101 to 55-4-504 (Michie Supp. 1992); Ch. 448, 1991 N.D. ALS 2100,
available in LEXIS, ND Library, ALS file; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 3-101 to 3-605,
4-101 to 4-504 (West Supp. 1993); Uniform Commercial Code Modernization Act, Act
No. 1992-97, 1992 Pa. Legis. Serv. 383 (Purdon); Uniform Commercial Code-General
Amendments, ch. 237, 1993 Utah Laws, available in WL, UT-Legis database; VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.3A-101 to 8.3A-605, 8.4-101 to 8.4-504 (Michie Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34.1-3-101 to 34.1-3-905, 34.1-4-101 to 34.1-4-504 (Supp. 1992). As ofMarch 29,1993,
the revised articles were pending in the legislatures of 9 more states: Alaska, Arizona,
Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, and West
Virginia. Letter from John McCabe, Counsel to the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, to author (April 1, 1993) (on file with author).
2. For the complete 1990 Official Text of Article Three of the Uniform Commercial
Code, see U.C.C. art. 3, 2 U.L.A. 17, 17-146 (1991) [hereinafter "Code" or "revised Code"
or "U.C.C."]. For the Official Text of the revised Article Four, see UC.C. art. 4, 2B
U.L.A. 5, 5-73 (1991). The former Official Text [hereinafter "former Code" or "pre-
revision Article Three"] still remains the law in most states. See supra note 1. For
purposes of clarity, this Article distinguishes between citations to the revised and former
U.C.C. by citing, respectively, to the 1990 and 1989 U.C.C. If unspecified, section
references are to the revised Code.
The simultaneous existence of both an older and a newer version of the Uniform
Commercial Code as law in different states has generated a grammatical "tense" problem
in this Article. The former Official Text of Articles Three and Four is still existing law
in 30 states. Referring to the former Code in the past tense may create the impression
that the discussion no longer represents current law. Referring to the former Code in
the present tense, however, conflicts with the existence of the new Official Text of
Articles Three and Four, the revised Code. The revised Code is already the law in 19
states. In the majority of states, then, the effects of the revised Code are still future
events. Every effort has been made to present the discussion clearly in this Article, even
at the expense of uniformity in grammatical tenses.
3. For example, § 3-406 states that "the loss is allocated between the person
precluded and the person asserting the preclusion according to the extent to which
the failure of each to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss." U.C.C. § 3-
406(b) (1990). Similarly, § 4-406 allocates the loss between the customer and the
bank "to the extent to which the failure of the customer to comply with subsection
(c) and the failure of the bank to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss."
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reality, the revisions to the Code will result in the reallocation
of loss from the bank to the customer. This result is due
exclusively to the synergistic effect of the new Code sections
that establish comparative negligence as the new standard for
loss allocation in the revised Code4 and companion changes
to the standard of ordinary care by which the bank's negli-
gence will be determined.5
The revised Code's new definition of ordinary care creates
a presumption that the bank is not negligent whenever it
conforms to general banking practice.6 For example, under
the revised Code a bank that abandons sight review7 of checks
and instead processes checks for collection electronically is
conclusively presumed to have met the standard of ordinary
care if it is customary in the banking industry to process
checks electronically. s Even as to banking practice in areas
other than the sight review of checks, the standard of ordinary
care is conclusively presumed to be met whenever the bank
conforms to Federal Reserve regulations or operating
circulars. 9 In effect, by operation of the new standard of
Id. § 4-406(e). Under both provisions, however, the bank is protected by the
standard of care set forth in § 3-103. Id. §§ 3-103(a)(7), 4-104(c).
4. See id. §§ 3-404 to 3-406, 4-406.
5. Section 3-103 defines "ordinary care" generally as the
observance of reasonable commercial standards [prevalent in the area] .... In the
case of a bank ... reasonable commercial standards do not require the bank to
examine the [check] if the failure to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed
procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general
banking usage ....
I& § 3-103(a)(7). Other changes also will affect this result. See, e.g., id. §§ 4-110, 4-406
(authorizing electronic presentment of checks and minimizing the information that banks
must provide to their customers).
6. Revised § 4-103(c) states, "[A]ction or non-action consistent with clearing-house
rules and the like or with a general banking usage not disapproved by this Article, is
prima facie the exercise of ordinary care." Id. § 4-103(c). Revised § 4-103 imports the
Article Three standards of good faith and ordinary care into Article Four. I& § 4-103
cmt. 4. For an in-depth discussion of ordinary care, see infra part V.
7. The practice ofviewing every check for forgery of the signatures or indorsements
or alteration of any term is known as "sight review" or 'sight examination." This proce-
dure was established to satisfy the contractual obligation to pay only checks that were
"properly payable" in accordance with the customer's order. See U.C.C. § 4-401 (1990);
U.C.C. § 4-401 (1989).
8. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990). The definition of"ordinary care" does not merely
state a standard; it in effect states a substantive rule of law. Banks are not required
to examine checks "if... the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general
banking usage." Id
9. Section 4-103(c) states, "Action or non-action approved by this Article or
pursuant to FederalReserve regulations or operating circulars is the exercise of ordinary
care . . . ." Id. § 4-103(c); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 590 F. Supp. 486, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that ifa U.C.C. or Federal Reserve
regulation is applicable "it provides a safe harbor, and a bank may conclusively
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ordinary care and other Code provisions, the revised Code
establishes the conforming bank's "nonnegligence per se."
'1
All of these changes implement the central purpose of the
revisions to Articles Three and Four: modernization of the
banking system to accommodate existing and future techno-
logical advances. At the same time, however, the changes in
the Code will make it substantially more difficult for custom-
ers1 to meet their obligations to prevent fraud and to detect
forgeries and alterations. 12 The revisions have increased the
customer's responsibilities'3 and enlarged the scope of the
customer's potential liabilities. 4 For instance, Article Four
demonstrate ordinary care by proving compliance with it"), later proceeding, 620 F. Supp.
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd mern., 786 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986).
10. If a statute imposes a duty to exercise ordinary care not to injure another,
violation of the statute constitutes negligence per se. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 226 & n.2 (5th ed. 1984); see U.C.C. §§ 3-
103(a)(7), 4-103(c), 4-406 (1990).
11. A customer is "a person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has
agreed to collect items, including a bank that maintains an account at another bank."
U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(5) (1990). Very few courts have construed "customer." See American
Nat'l Bank v. Stanfill, 252 Cal. Rptr. 861, 866 (Ct. App. 1988) (lamenting the "dearth
of authority" construing the U.C.C. § 4-104 definition of customer).
12. Forexample, § 4-406(dX2) precludes acustomer from asserting againstthe bank
a forged signature or alteration if the customer 'had been afforded a reasonable period
of time, not exceeding 30 days, in which to examine the item or statement of account
and notify the bank" of the unauthorized modification to the check. U.C.C. § 4-406(dX2)
(1990). An "item" is an instrument that includes a check. U.C.C. §§ 4-104(a)(9), 3-
104(b)(f) (1990). There are no exceptions for extended vacation, illness, or postal delay,
nor for obtaining a copy of truncated checks. An "alteration" is "(i) an unauthorized
change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party,
or (ii) an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete
instrument relating to the obligation of a party." Id § 3-407(a) (1990). Although
Comment 1 indicates that this merely restates former U.C.C. §'3-407, the revised subsec-
tion does not refer to a "change in ... the number or relations of the parties" as an
alteration, as did the former subsection. See id. § 3-407(a) cmt. 1; U.C.C. § 3-407(1)(a)
(1989). Apparently, under the revised Code, changing the number of the parties to an
instrument does not necessarily modify the obligation of a party. But see PETER A. ALcES,
THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACIIONS 3.16, at 3-51 (1989) (stating that if the alteration
changes either the number or relations of the parties liable on the instrument, the
alteration is material).
13. For example, § 3-405(b) makes the customer responsible for the fraudulent
indorsements of its employee if it gives the employee responsibilities such as preparing,
storing, and depositing checks; reconciling bank statements and accounts; supplying
information with respect to payees; controlling the disposition of the instruments issued
in the name of the customer; and other unspecified actions. U.C.C. § 3-405(b) (1990);
see also id. § 3-405(a)(3) (defining responsibility). The revisions further provide that
a check may be enforced against the customer even though the customer's own signature
does not appear on the check. Id. § 3-401(a).
14. The revisions increased the scope of liability by expanding the class of persons
for whom the customer is responsible. Section 3-405(a)(1) includes as an "employee"
of the customer "an independent contractor and employee of an independent contractor
retained by the employer." Id. § 3-405(aX1). It remains to be seen how persons in
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authorizes electronic presentment of checks 5 and facilitates
check truncation-the conversion of the information on checks
to electronic impulses at some point in the collection process. 16
The changes are designed to reduce costs and to cope with the
staggering volume of checks processed each year.
17
Under a check truncation system, banks will not be required
to return the paper check to the customer, but instead will be
required only to provide information concerning the check
transaction on the monthly statement of account. 8 Each
customer will be required, nonetheless, to determine promptly
whether a forged or altered check has been paid and to notify
the bank promptly of any unauthorized payment if the
customer "should reasonably have discovered the unauthorized
payment." 9 If the customer fails to comply with the obliga-
tions, the customer- "is precluded" from asserting that any
item was forged or altered after the first such item and will
not be able to recover the loss from the payor bank even
though the bank paid the item contrary to the customer's
order.2 °
These additional burdens will contribute to the placing of
the loss from payment of forged or altered checks on the now
"negligent" customer, despite the Code's inclusion of a
comparative negligence standard. These burdens may not be
business actually will be able to exercise any control over an independent contractor's
employees. The explicit language of this provision all but mandates a finding that the
customer is negligent if the customer does not exercise that control.
15. A "check" is a type of draft. Id. § 3-104(f). A "draft" is a negotiable instrument
that is an order to pay. Id. § 3-104(b), (e). A "check" is therefore an order drawn on
a bank to pay a fixed amount of money on demand. Id. § 3-104(a), (c), (f); cf. U.C.C.
§ 3-104(1), (2) (1989) (requiring a check to be a "writing" that is "signed" by the drawer).
16. Section 4-110 of the revised Code authorizes presentment of checks by means
of the transmission of an image of the item or information describing the item rather
than delivery of the item itself. Id. § 4-110.
17. Banks are faced with "an unrealistically onerous and expensive burden of
inspecting an 'immense volume of checks.'" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Chemical Bank, 442 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (N.Y. 1982). In 1987, more than 40 billion
checks were processed in the United States alone. NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE
ASS'N, IMPLEMENTING ACH CORPORATE PAYMENTS 13 (1987). By 1990, the volume increased
to 56 billion checks annually. Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Introduction to
Symposium, Revised U.C.C. Articles 3 & 4 and New Article 4A, 42 ALA. L. REV. 373, 392
(1991).
18. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (1990).
19. Id § 4-406(c). Section 4-406(dX2) states that the customer must be "afforded
a reasonable period of time, not exceeding 30 days, in which to examine the item or
statement of account and notify the bank." Id. § 4-406(dX2).
20. Id. § 4-406(dX2). The customer will also be precluded if the bank proves that
it suffered a loss because of the customer's failure to report promptly the unauthorized
payment. Id. § 4-406(dXl).
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too difficult for meticulous customers who retain good records,
but even these customers will be unable to detect reliably a
forgery or alteration under the proposed truncation system
because they will not see the checks themselves.2' In short,
these changes will dramatically affect the consumers of
banking services.
This Article will examine modern banking practices with
respect to processing checks and the effect of technology on
liability for forged or altered checks. Part I describes the
magnetic ink character-recognition system. Part II discusses
check truncation. Part III recounts the evolution of contract
and tort theories of liability from traditional to modern bank
practices. Part IV analyzes the new comparative negligence
provisions. Part V investigates the standards of ordinary care.
Part VI evaluates the respective duties of the banks and their
customers in light of the provisions that reflect the banking
industry's transformation from the Paper Age to the Electronic
Era. Recognizing that the nationwide enactment of revised
Articles Three and Four is inevitable, the final Part of this
Article discusses the need for and concludes with recommen-
dations for consumer legislation to protect consumers of
banking services.
I. MODERN BANK PRACTICES: THE MICR SYSTEM
Normally, the recipient of a check, the payee, either cashes
the check over the counter or deposits it in an account with
a local bank.Y Traditionally, the bank reviews the signatures
and examines the checks for alterations or other indicia of
21. Federal law and the Code revisions envision a system of check truncation
whereby the physical checks will not be returned to the customer. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 229.36(c) (1992) (allowing truncation between presenting and paying banks); U.C.C.
§ 4-110 (1990) (defining an "agreement for electronic presentment" as one which allows
presentment of an item by transmission of an image of the item). Revised § 4-406 does
not require the bank statement to identify the payee or to reveal any information about
signatures. Id. § 4-406. Therefore, because the paper check will not be returned, even
a customer who promptly reviews bank statements will not be able to detect whether
an indorsement is forged or if the second of two required signatures is forged or missing.
Moreover, although the customer may see that the proper amount has been debited, the
customer will not know whether the proper payee received the payment. For more on
check truncation, see infra part II.
22. A "bank" is "a person engaged in the business of banking, including a savings
bank, savings and loan association, credit union, or trust company." U.C.C. § 4-105(1)
(1989).
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fraud. 23 In an automated system, the depositary bank' sends
the checks upon receipt to the proofing department where they
are photographed on microfilm and bundled for sorting. The
checks are then taken to data processing and sorted by a
machine that reads the checks' magnetic ink characters.'
The magnetic ink character-recognition (MICR) system
revolutionized banking practicesY At the bottom of a typical
bank check there is a "clear band" strip reserved for encoding
in magnetic ink the magnetic symbols called MICR characters.
This MICR line contains a routing number,27 a transposition
check digit, the check number, the branch number of the bank,
and the account number.' On another clear band on the
check, a bank employee encodes in magnetic ink the amount
of the check.2 9 The MICR characters identify the payor bank
(the bank on which the check is drawn),a° the amount of the
23. See, e.g., First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Cutright, 205 N.W.2d 542,544-45 (Neb.
1973) (outlining the procedures used to examine signatures).
24. Section 4-105(2) defines the depositary bank as "the first bank to take an item."
U.C.C. § 4-105(2) (1990). If the item is presented for immediate payment over the
counter, however, the bank is considered to be the payor bank rather than the depositary
bank. Id. § 4-105(2)-(3). For a detailed description of check processing, see Judge
Knapp's opinion in Northpark Natl Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 572 F. Supp. 524, 525-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
25. See Nelson v. Platte Valley State Bank & Trust Co., 805 F.2d 332,334 (8th Cir.
1986) (describing the processing of checks). Eventually image-processing technology may
replace microfilm, but such a system would require sub stantial investments in equipment
and programmers before cost savings are realized. Brian Whitehead, Several Roads Lead
to Lower-Cost Data Processing, AM. BANKER, June 24, 1991, at 7A.
Presumably, banks that have not automated the collection process are expected to
continue the traditional practice of manually reviewing checks for forgery or alteration.
Section 3-103(a)(7) only exempts banks that take an instrument "for processing for
collection or payment by automated means" from the traditional bank practice of sight
review. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990). Many banks already have abandoned sight review
for small dollar amount checks even though this provision was not in the former Code.
26. MICR-Shield Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 404 F.2d 157, 158 (5th Cir. 1968); see also
SOS Oil Corp. v. Norstar Bank, 548 N.Y.S.2d 308,309 (App. Div. 1989) (holding the bank
liable for erroneous magnetic encoding of a check that was deposited by a customer),
affd, 563 N.E.2d 258 (1990).
27. The routing number in the MICR line is repeated in ordinary numerals in the
upper right-hand corner of every check. The routing number specifies the payor bank.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 590 F. Supp. 486, 490
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), later proceeding, 620 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd mern., 786 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1986).
28. NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, supra note 17, at 162-63.
29. MICR.Shield Co., 404 F.2d at 158. For a description of error correction
techniques and the problems created by MICR technology, see id. at 158-59.
30. A payor bank is a bank that is "the drawee of a draft." U.C.C. § 4-105(3)
(1990). Former § 4-105(b) defined a payor bank as a bank "by which an item is
payable as drawn or accepted." U.C.C. § 4-105(b) (1989). It is the bank that pays
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check, and the customer's account number,"1 which in turn
identifies the drawer-depositor. 32 The encoding can be read
electronically, either by a magnetic or an optical character-
recognition device, and checks therefore generally do not
require manual attention for most of the check collection
process.33 The automatic check sorting machine comes across
the MICR line and automatically routes the item to a
designated pocket of the machine.'
After processing, the depositary bank forwards the check,
usually through intermediary banks, 35 to the payor bank.
Upon receipt by the payor bank the check again is processed
through sorters. Because the check was drawn on the payor
bank, the check is further sorted by the account number. A
sorter-reader machine physically "reads" the information from
the MICR characters, passing the data electronically to a
computer which performs the bookkeeping.3" A computer
verifies the sufficiency of funds in the payor's account, stamps
the check "paid," and debits the payor's account. Following
this process, the check is sent to bookkeeping for verification
of endorsements, signatures, and account balances, and for
filing pending return to the drawer. 37 The payor bank honors
the check by debiting its depositor's account, and the payee's
account is credited with the amount represented in the
check.38
the check from the customer's account maintained at that bank. The payor bank
may also be referred to as the drawee, or the drawee bank.
31. MICR-Shield Co., 404 F.2d at 158.
32. SOS Oil Corp. v. Norstar Bank, 548 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (App. Div. 1989), affd,
563 N.E.2d 258 (1990).
33. Id.
34. If the check were truncated at the point of entry, the check would be stored at
the bank and the data from the MICR line would be transmitted electronically to the
paying bank for verification and settlement. Jeffrey Kutler, Truncation Dispute is
Settled, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 1980, at 1.
35. See U.C.C. § 4-105(4) (1990) (defining intermediary bank); U.C.C. § 4-105(c)
(1989) (same).
36. MICR-Shield Co. v. First Natl Bank, 404 F.2d 157, 158 (5th Cir. 1968).
37. The drawer is the person "who signs or is identified in a draft as a person
ordering payment." U.C.C. § 3-103(3) (1990).
38. In Nelson Platte Valley State Bank & Trust Co., the court held that the process
of posting was completed when the steps taken were completed, and the bank could not
reverse the process to comply with a stop order payment even though posting was
completed before the midnight deadline. 805 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1986). But see West
Side Bank v. Marine Natl Exch. Bank, 155 N.W.2d 587,593 (Wis. 1968) (construing the
payment not to be final until all opportunity to reverse entries had passed). Revised
§ 4-215 deleted the provision on completion of the process of posting as unsuitable for
a system of automated check collection or electronic presentment. See U.C.C. § 4-215
cmt. 5 (1990).
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A. Technologically Induced Liability
1. MICR Fraud-MICR characters present their own in-
triguing brand of fraud3 9  In United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank,4 ° for example, the
fraudster effectively used modern technology to perpetrate a
fraud by delaying the discovery that his account had insuffi-
cient funds to cover the check. He inserted MICR numbers
that did not correspond with the original, preprinted routing
number written on the check that he deposited with Union
Trust Company of Maryland. The MICR line routing symbol
that he inserted started with the designation for the New York
Federal Reserve District's Utica Processing Center, but the
pre-printed routing fraction on the check advised routing
through the State Bank of Albany, New York.41 Because of
the resulting delay, Union Trust, the depositary bank, paid
$755,000 on the bogus $850,000 check. By analogy to U.C.C.
section 3-406, the court placed the loss on Union Trust for
having engaged in reckless conduct.42 The teller had failed
to comply with the bank's policy requiring tellers to inform
the branch manager of check deposits in excess of $100,000
and had failed to place a hold on the balance of the account.43
2. Encoding Errors-Automated check processing may
lead to liability not only for MICR fraud but also for honest
mistakes in encoding. SOS Oil Corp. v. Norstar Bank,44 for
example, presented the issue of whether misencoding
constituted "gross negligence."45 The payee expected to have
$255,000, the face amount of the check, deposited to its
39. See Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Patricia Fry, MICR Fraud: A Systems Approach to
Foiling the Felon's Fun, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1986). For an interesting description
of the use of improperly printed checks and incorrectly stated MICR numbers to
perpetrate a fraud, see Fred R. Bleakley, How Hutton Scheme Worked, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1985, at DI, D4.
40. 590 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), later proceeding, 620 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd mem., 786 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986).
41. 590 F. Supp. at 490. The MICR number was "nonsensical." Id. at 498. The
MICR numbers were not printed in magnetic ink. 620 F. Supp. at 366; see also Leary
& Fry, supra note 39, at 750 (describing the fraudulent scheme that is the subject of
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty).
42. 620 F. Supp. at 372 ("[It is appropriate to apply [U.C.C. § 3-406's] spirit by
analogy to apportionment of loss due to MICR fraud.").
43. Id. at 364, 373.
44. 548 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1989), affd, 563 N.E.2d 258 (1990).
45. Id. at 309.
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account with the bank. Instead, the bank encoded the check
as only $25,000 and credited the payee's account with that
amount. The encoding bank was also the payor bank and the
depositary bank. While the payor bank was held strictly
liable for the full amount of the check, the issue of negligence
was left unresolved.46
In another misencoding case, Bank One v. National City
Bank,47 the depositary bank encoded a $50,000 check as a
$5000 item.48 The payor bank read the MICR encoding on the
check and debited $5000 from the drawer's account. Naturally
the payee complained. The depositary bank credited its
customer's account with the additional $45,000 and brought
an action to recover the $45,000 from the payor bank.
Meanwhile, the drawer had filed for bankruptcy, and the
drawer's bank refused to pay because it had set off the amount
in the drawer's account to satisfy the depositor's debt to the
drawee. 49 Unlike the court in SOS Oil Corp., the Bank One
trial court found Bank One, the depositary bank, negligent
in encoding the check. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that,
in misencoding the check, the depositary bank breached its
duty of ordinary care and its contractual duty to the payor
bank by allowing the misencoded check to be included with
the machinable items to be processed by the payor bank.5 °
Ordinarily, the payor bank would be liable for the original
amount of a check that it accepted for final payment. 1 The
parties, however, may agree to vary this outcome.5 2 In Bank One
46. Id. The lower court held that the encoding error did not constitute "gross"
negligence, and that the causes of action for breach of contract and negligence were
defeated by the 14-day waiver-of-liability clause in the agreement between the depositor
and the bank. The appeal from these issues was denied as moot because the court found
strict liability under U.C.C.§ 4-302 (1989). Under that section, the item was considered
finally paid if the payor bank accepted the check, paid the item, or failed to return the
check before the midnight deadline. Id.
47. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1122 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
48. Id. at 1123.
49. Id. The setoff right was exercised after payment of the misencoded check but
before request was made for the balance. The court held that because the funds in the
account were not earmarked the setoff was proper. Id. at 1127.
50. Id. at 1125-26. Encoding duties include the duty to exercise ordinary care in
the encoding, the duty to verify the encoding, and, after discovering the error, the duty
to make the misencoded check "non-machinable" or to properly re-encode the check.
Id. at 1125.
51. See, e.g., SOS Oil Corp., 548 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
52. U.C.C. § 4-103(a) (1990); U.C.C. § 4-103(1) (1989); Bank One, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
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both banks were members of the same clearinghouse s3 and the
clearinghouse rules had the effect of an agreement between the
banks without further formality.' Under the clearinghouse
rules, which controlled the duties owed between the institutions
in regard to encoding and processing checks, the payor bank was
entitled to rely on the depositary bank to remove misencoded
checks from machinable checks.55 Therefore, the Bank One court
held that the clearinghouse rules shifted the liability from the
payor bank to the depositary bank when the depositary bank
breached its agreement with the payor bank by misencoding the
check.5"
The dissent in Bank One argued that the payor bank should
be held strictly liable for having improperly paid the check
and rejected the application of the clearinghouse rules to alter
the loss allocation liability.57 Until the revisions to Article
Four are enacted, observed the dissent, the traditional law
should apply." 
I
Bank One illustrates the creative use of clearinghouse rules
to impose liability for misencoding without the assistance of
encoding warranties, 9 which are introduced by the revised
Code. The loss for failing to pay the check according to its
original amount was allocated to the bank in the best position
to prevent loss-in this case, the encoding bank. The same
result should be achieved under the revised Code through the
encoding warranties.
53. The check was processed through the Cleveland Clearing House. Bank One,
10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1125. A "clearinghouse" is "an association of
banks or other payors regularly clearing items." U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(4) (1990).
54. Former § 4-103 provides for operation of clearinghouse rules and regulations
as agreements "whether or not specifically assented to by all parties interested in items
handled." U.C.C. § 4-103(2) (1989). The substance of this provision is unchanged in
revised Article Four. See U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (1990).
55. Bank One, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d. (Callaghan) at 1125-26.
56. Id. at 1126.
57. Id. at 1127. The dissent, however, suggested that comparative fault and proxi-
mate cause should be considered. Id. at 1127-28 (Cirgliano, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1128 (Cirgliano, J., dissenting). The dissent also added that the forum
suggested in the clearinghouse rules for dispute resolution should have been utilized.
Id.
59. Revised § 4-209 sets forth the encoding warranties whereby the person who
encodes the information warrants to any subsequent bank or other payor that the
information is encoded correctly. U.C.C. § 4-209 (1990). This provision is new to the
Code and is another example of adapting to modern technology by facilitating electronic
presentment.
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B. The Policy for Shifting Loss to Negligent Customers
Generally, the Code allocates loss to the person who is best
able to prevent it. 6 Various theories support the Code's loss-
allocation rules. Under one theory, where both parties are
equally innocent or equally culpable, liability rests on the last
person to hold the instrument who could have prevented the
success of the fraud.61 According to another theory, the loss
falls upon the person with the greatest degree of culpability
in terms of responsibility, based upon the mental state,
conduct, or position of the party.62 Under this hierarchical
"culpability scale," the loss would fall first on the one who
intentionally created the situation, second on the one who
knew of the relevant circumstances, third on the one who
could have discovered the circumstaices and who failed to
exercise ordinary care, and fourth on the one who could have
avoided the loss at the least cost.63 The traditional principles
of loss allocation have been summarized neatly in two rules:
"[F]or bearer instruments, the loss falls on the fellow before
the scalawag; for order instruments, the loss falls on the
fellow after the scalawag."r Fixed rules such as these
promote the transferability and use of checks and have the
advantage of uniformity and certainty of application.65
60. See, e.g., Algemene Bank Nederland v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 89 Civ. 4946,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 470, at *7, 1991 WL 4513, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1991); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 620 F. Supp. 361, 371 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd mem., 786 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986); see also James S. Rogers, The Irrelevance
of Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment System, 65
TEX. L. REv. 929,956 (1987) (stating that the application of Article Four results in risk
falling on the party best able to present loss).
61. The party who most easily could have prevented the harm frequently is the best
risk bearer. Bryan D. Hull, Common Law Negligence and Check Fraud Loss Allocation:
Has Common Law Supplanted the U.C.C.?, 51 OIRO ST. L.J. 605, 614 (1990); see also
Hanover Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 510 (D. Kan. 1979)
(holding the bank liable under direct and proximate cause theories and observing that
both the bank and the customer were innocent as to the specific fraud perpetrated by
the customer's employee, but that neither was totally without fault in permitting the
fraud to be temporarily successful).
62. David M. Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, 228
(1982).
63. Id. at 228-29. Phillips categorizes the culpable conduct, in descending order
of magnitude, in terms of intention, knowledge, negligence, and strict liability. Id.
64. Rogers, supra note 60, at 952.
65. Hull, supra note 61, at 612-13.
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The need for adapting to modern technology has generated
various other theories of loss allocation." Under one theory,
the customer could be held strictly liable for forged checks up
to a certain dollar amount and the bank could be liable for the
remainder of the loss.6" Another proposal takes the entirely
opposite approach. The bank would be strictly liable for
payment of checks under a specified low dollar amount, such
as $500, regardless of the customer's negligence, but the loss
would be shared for amounts in excess of the threshold."
With the full-scale implementation of technological im-
provements, however, it no longer will be simply an equitable
question of whether a bank or its customer should bear the
loss of a forged or altered item. At the root of the loss-
allocation scheme lies a fundamental policy question: should
losses be absorbed by the providers or by the users of the sys-
tem?69 Shifting the burden of losses from the banking
institutions to their users may facilitate the process of
modernization, but it will impose additional responsibilities
on bank customers. If, however, banks are saddled with
liability when they depart from the traditional bank practice
of sight review, they will not be free to implement new
technology that will expedite check processing and save costs.
To process enormous volumes of checks by automation, the
revised Code permits check truncation and relieves banks of the
obligation to sight review checks.70 Loss reallocation was
perceived as essential to full implementation of modern
66. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Lucie, Check Kiting: The Inadequacy of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 4 DUKE L.J. 728, 729 (1986) (advocating a proportional allocation of
loss between banks for check-kiting schemes).
67. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin,A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer
Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 97 (1987).
68. Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. Dow, Banks and Their Customers Under the Revisions
to Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4: Allocation of Losses Resulting from Forged
Drawers' Signatures, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 57, 75-77 (1991). Ellis & Dow contend that
a strict liability rule may encourage collusion, that the customer will be encouraged to
take precautions because the customer does not know in advance whether the loss from
a forgery will be greater than $500, and that such a rule would be fair because most
customers are unlikely to litigate for low dollar amounts. Id.; see also Hull, supra note
61, at 612 & n.62 (stating that the costs involved in making factual determinations of
negligence would be greater than all but catastrophic losses on consumer accounts).
69. Rogers, supra note 60, at 955.
70. U.C.C. §§ 4-103(c), 4-110 (1990); see K & K Mfg., Inc. v. Union Bank, 628 P.2d
44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Space Distribs., Inc. v. Flagship Bank, 402 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Five Towns College v. Citibank N.A., 489 N.Y.S.2d 338 (App. Div. 1985).
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technology. To enable banks to modernize without fear of
liability for the departure from historical bank practice, the
revised Code increases the responsibilities of all users and
imposes losses on the negligent users of the system rather than
on the banks.
Many of the changes may be necessary, and even desirable,
from the vantage point of overall efficiency, economy, and
federal preemption. 71  However, if different standards of
negligence will be imposed on consumers than on banks the
fundamental fairness of the system may be challenged.
Resistance to the new system could become particularly acute
if consumers perceive that the losses disproportionately
burden individual users of the system and therefore feel
incapable of protecting themselves. It is unlikely that
consumers will even become aware of the impact of the
revisions until after enactment in their respective states.
These revisions seem to anticipate a degree of consumer
dissatisfaction by setting statutory limits to banks' obliga-
tions. Nevertheless, the customer's reaction to the changes
will need to be addressed as the revisions continue to promote
commercial expansion of the banking industry and contem-
plate further technological advances.
C. The Context of Modern Banking Practice
in the Federal System
The new rules allocating loss liability for fraud and forgery
under revised Articles Three and Four are designed to
facilitate the development of an electronically based system
of check collection.72 The revisions remove impediments to the
71. Efficiency and economy are not the only goals of the Federal Reserve System.
If certain markets of consumers are not served, the Federal Reserve will "ensure access
to reasonably priced payment services by all depositary institutions." Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Jr., Remarks at the Check Processing Conference of the Bank Administra-
tion Institute (June 1991) (on file with The University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
72. The preface to revised Article Three specifically refers to the inadequacy of the
existing Code to address the issues of responsibility and liability as they relate to modern
technologies. U.C.C. prefatory note, reprinted in 2 U.L.A. 7 (1991).
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use of automation, reduce the risks to banks,73 and conform
to the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987' (EFAA) and
the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation CC.75 To the extent
that the law of any state, including a state's version of the
Uniform Commercial Code, is inconsistent with the EFAA or
Regulation CC, the federal statute controls.76
The EFAA broadly delegates authority to the Federal
Reserve Board "to allocate among depositary institutions the
risk of loss and liability in connection with any aspect of the
payment system, including the receipt, payment, collection,
or clearing of checks."77 The EFAA first was used to expedite
the check return system.78 Regulation CC, the regulation
implementing the EFAA, authorized the payor bank to return
a dishonored check directly to the depositary bank instead of
retracing the check through the circuitous route of the forward
collection process.79 Formerly, the Code permitted the deposi-
tary bank to place a hold on checks to give them a reasonable
time to clear.' Some banks greatly extended these holding
periods to prevent depositors from drawing against the
deposited funds until the checks had cleared, causing
consumer complaints.8' The EFAA and Regulation CC
73. Reducing the risks to banks was perceived as a benefit to the public interest.
See id. at 10 (1991) ("Balance Achieved"). The preface to revised Article Three applauds
the revisions as accommodating the needs of the public interest, users, and the banking
community. Id.
74. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988).
75. 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-.42 (1992). The Federal Reserve Board implemented the
EFAA by issuing Regulation CC, which took effect in 1988. 12 C.F.R. § 229.1.
76. 12 U.S.C. § 4007(b) (1988); see also U.C.C. § 4-102 cmt. 1 (1990) (stating that
applicable federal law, specifically the EFAA and Regulation CC, supersedes the
provisions of the Code). Revised § 3-102(c) provides that "[regulations of the Board of
Governors of the FederalReserve System and operating circulars of the FederalReserve
Banks supersede any inconsistent provision of this Article to the extent of the
inconsistency." U.C.C. § 3-102(c) (1990). Conflicts between Articles Three and Four are
governed by the provisions of Article Four. Id.
77. 12 U.S.C. § 4010. Before Congress enacted the EFAA, the Federal Reserve
Board could exercise bank collection functions and regulate payments handled by the
Federal Reserve System. Id. § 221.
78. Consumer dissatisfaction with the long holding periods that some banks had
placed on checks led to the enactment of the EFAA. See DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 278-79 (2d ed. 1988).
79. 12 C.F.R. § 229.30(a). The ability of a payor bank to route the check directly
to the depositary bank or through a bank not involved in the forward collection process
is an important departure from the formerU.C.C., which requiredthe return of the check
through the chain of forward collection. See U.C.C. § 4-214 & cmts. 1-3 (1989).
80. U.C.C. § 4-213(4)(a) (1989). For a further explanation of this process, see
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 590 F. Supp. 486,489-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), laterproceeding, 620 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd mer., 786 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1986).
81. WHALEY, supra note 78, at 278.
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superseded contrary state provisions and expedited check
processing so that funds could become available to consumers
more quickly.'
In addition to pleasing consumers, the expedited return was
designed to advise the depositary bank whether the payor
bank had refused to pay the check before the depositary bank
allowed its customer to draw against that check.8 By making
funds available more quickly to consumers, however, Regula-
tion CC also increased the likelihood that a depositary bank
would allow a customer to draw against uncollected funds.'"
Therefore, even more rapid information transmission became
necessary. The EFAA directed the Federal Reserve Board to
consider requiring banks to utilize electronic processing of
checks and check truncation.85
II. CHECK TRUNCATION
Check truncation is the conversion of paper checks to
electronic signals at some point in the collection process.r
The checks are not returned to the bank customers.87 The
EFAA first authorized the Federal Reserve Board to consider
requiring that banks provide for check truncation8 and
82. UnderRegulation CC, local checks should clear within two days, nonlocal checks
within five days. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.12(b), (c). Regarding next-day availability of funds
for checks under $100, see 12 CF.R. § 229.10(c). Expeditious returns are regulated by
12 C.F.R. § 229.30(a)(1), (2). Two excuses for the bank's failure to meet its deadlines
which are not listed in the U.C.C. are interruption of computer facilities and equipment
failure. 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(c). It would not be unreasonable to assume that a bank would
be able to raise these same excuses as a defense for its inability to produce a legible copy
of the customer's check pursuant to revised U.C.C. § 4-406. If this were to be the case,
the customer would have neither the original paper check nor a usable copy.
83. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.30.
84. Banks must process checks roughly within a day of receipt. Algemene Bank
Nederland v. Federal Reserve Bank, No. 89 Civ. 4946, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 470, at
*6, 1991 WL 4513, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1991). The imposition of additional customer
responsibilities to prevent loss and the invocation of comparative loss provisions may
be due in part to banks' recognition that losses are likely to increase with the increased
likelihood of paying against uncollected funds.
85. 12 U.S.C. § 4008(b)(2) (1988).
86. NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, supra note 17, at 168.
87. Id.
88. 12 U.S.C. § 4008(b)(2) (1988); see supra part I.C (discussing the interaction of
federal law with Articles Three and Four). The EFAA and Regulation CC supersede
any inconsistent provisions of the U.C.C. as adopted in any state and any other state
law to the extent of the inconsistency. See 12 U.S.C. § 4007(b) (1988); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 229.20, 229.41 (1992). To the extent that federal law has preempted this area, this
change is not dramatic. But, in the context of the U.C.C., electronic presentment will
transform the way banking business is conducted, especially with respect to bank-
ustomer relations.
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Regulation CC now authorizes truncation of checks. 9 Revised
Code section 4-110 further paves the way for check truncation
by changing the legal requirements in state law for the
presentment of checks.9 ° It provides for presentment of a
check by transmission of "an image" of the check "or informa-
tion" describing the check rather than by delivery of the check
itself, thus liberating the banking industry from processing
paper checks. 91
Unlike many other changes in law, which arise legislatively
in response to public opinion, check truncation is propelled
by advances in technology and by the banking industry itself.92
Check truncation is endorsed by the banking industry because
of the enormous costs saved from eliminating the processing,
transportation, and mailing of tons of paper.93 These savings
are maximized if the checks are truncated at the point of
entry, usually the depositary bank. If the checks are
truncated at the point of entry, however, the payor bank will
not have an opportunity to review the original signatures on
the checks prior to honoring them. 9' Obviously, with no paper
checks there will be no sight review. To require banks
nevertheless to fulfill their traditional obligation to review
signatures on checks before payment would pose a major
obstacle to check truncation. Accordingly, eliminating sight
review removes a major obstacle to implementing a national
check truncation system for processing checks.
89. 12 C.F.R. § 229.36(c).
90. U.C.C. § 4-110(a) (1990). Revised § 4-110 is entirely new to the Code.
Presentment of a check is a necessary precondition to payment of the check. See U.C.C.
§ 3-501 (1990); see also U.C.C. §§ 3-501 to 3-507 (1989) (detailing the process of
presentment). The presentment of a check is the demand for payment. U.C.C. § 3-501
(1990).
91. U.C.C. § 4-110(a) (1990).
92. Jeffrey Kutler, Consultant's Search for Savings Creates a Revisionist View of
Check Truncation, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1980, at 12. (stating that check truncation is
not demanded by the consumers; it is offered by the bankers to keep their costs down);
see also Robert M. Garsson, Electronic Society: What's Holding It Up?, AM. BANKER,
May 15, 1984, at 18 (expressing concern that the banking industry has been unable to
move customers into the electronic age); Farnsworth, supra note 71 (asserting that bank
operational changes will be driven by technological change, not by consumer demand).
93. See, e.g., J.D. Carreker, Strides in Electronic Checking Transforming Payment
System, MAG. BANK MGMT., Mar. 1992, at 18, 26.
94. Image technology can be used to reproduce the check, but it is regarded as too,
costly. Whitehead, supra note 25, at 7A.
142
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A. Three Basic Truncation Models
1. Check Retention Plans-The most familiar model of
check truncation is the agreement between the payor bank
and its customer that checks will not be returned to the
customer. This arrangement more accurately is referred to
as a check retention plan; strictly speaking, this arrangement
is not check truncation because the check proceeds through
the entire collection process and stops only at the last
processing point, the customer's bank.95 The principal benefits
are savings on postage and familiarizing customers with the
non-return of checks. If the customer requests a copy of the
check, the customer often will have to pay a fee.
96
2. True Truncation-A true check truncation arrange-
ment arises by agreement between the depositary bank, the
collecting bank, the payor bank, and the customer of the payor
bank.9' This second model is distinguishable from a check
retention plan because the check is presented to the deposi-
tary bank and the paper check proceeds no further through
the system. 98 An identifier on the check automatically arrests
the check in the collection process. The depositary bank,
contract encoder, or participating Federal Reserve Bank then
will encode the checks and only the electronic information will
proceed through the check collection system. After encoding,
presentment is made by presentment notice, which may be an
electronic signal, and the check is retained at the first process-
ing point, which is usually the depositary bank.99 Use of this
truncation model will maximize the savings to the industry.
3. Payor-Payee Arrangements-The third model of check
truncation resembles the prototype because the check will be
95. See U.C.C. § 4-110 cmt. 1 (1990). The credit union share draft is an example
of this kind of truncation.
96. See id § 4-406 cmt. 2.
97. See id § 4-110 cmt. 1; Telephone Interview with George C. White, former
Chairperson of the New York Payments Commission, publisher of the White Papers,
and one of the original promotors of check truncation (June 2, 1992).
98. This is the most cost-effective model because it avoids transportation and storage
costs after the point of entry at the depositary bank. Fred M. Gregutas & Larry L.
Cartile, New Law May SpeedPayment ofBond Coupons Electronically, AM. BANKER, Aug.
14, 1980, at 17.
99. See U.C.C. § 4-110 cmt. 1 (1990). If the checks are not destroyed, the depositary
bank or a contractor with the depositary bank will retain the checks.
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truncated at the depositary bank.' °° Unlike the prototype,
however, this truncation system envisions an agreement
between the customer and the payee. By agreement with the
payee, the customer-payor would deliver the check to a
designated lockbox for payment. 10 1 The checks then would be
collected from the lockbox and the depositary bank would
encode the information and electronically present the check
for payment." This would generate a transaction through
a clearinghouse or bank and ultimately the payor bank would
debit the customer's account. This third system is designed
for use by a payee to whom repetitive or recurring payments
must be made, such as utility companies."0 3 The payee cuts
down on costs because the costs of encoding and electronic
presentment are less than the costs of depositing the checks,
particularly where there is a large volume of customers. The
customer does not necessarily need the paper check, because
the customer knows who the payee is and has an independent
system of payment verification in addition to the regular bank
statement by virtue of the utility company's monthly bills.
Because check-processing costs still are higher for paper
checks than for electronic signals, truncation participants
might obtain a discount for agreeing to truncate checks, or
conversely, nonparticipants might be assessed a fee for
receiving their checks.
B. Transition from Sight Review to Truncation
The benefits of truncating checks notwithstanding, paper
checks will be difficult to relinquish. Banks should expect
resistance to any of the truncation models because paper
checks are used as proof of payment, evidence of contracts in
100. Telephone Interviews with George C. White, publisher of the White Papers,
former Chairperson of the New York Payments Commission and one of the original
promotors of check truncation (June 2-4, 1991).
101. One of the purposes of the lockbox is to allow for customers who agreed to
truncation, and those who did not. Id.
102. The depositary bank couldcontract for the encoding services ofanothercompany,
thereby raising interesting privacy and liability issues. See infra, Part VII.
103. This type of truncation system will also work for small, premium, rebate-type
items. The amounts are relatively low and constant, posing little risk of loss. The model
will be initiated most successfully by utility companies, grocery stores, and department
stores because these payees are likely to perceive financial benefits and still satisfy
customer needs for record keeping. White, supra note 97.
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the absence of any other writing, and for record keeping.
Handwriting experts may need the original check to distin-
guish authentic signatures from forgeries.'O If satisfactory
substitutes are provided, however, consumer acceptance may
follow.
The revised Code discards sight review as an outmoded
practice and endorses the conversion from a paper-based
system to a system of electronic presentment and check
truncation. While losses from forgeries may be relatively
small in the current paper-based check processing system,
they are viewed from the perspective of the practice as it
exists today.'1 5 A new system, in which checks will not be
returned either to the bank customers or to the payor bank,
presents a vista of possibilities for clever fraudsters. 0 6 There
are no alternative safeguards to sight review while the system
is paper-based or in transition, nor are any safeguards built
into the electronic systems to protect against the possibility
of forgery and alteration. Consequently, the losses arguably
can be expected to increase. 10 7  Until check truncation is
implemented fully, then, sight review should not be abandoned
completely. Banks may develop procedures out of a sense of
fairness or good-faith efforts to avoid loss to others, but the
banks will not have a direct, legally enforceable incentive to
establish such procedures because bank negligence will be
difficult to establish under the revised Code.00
To restore some balance, the definition of "ordinary care"
in the revised Code should be amended to require banks to
104. See Harold R. Weinberg, Pleading and Practice in Commercial Paper Cases:
Burdens of Proof, 72 KY. L.J. 575, 580 (1983-84).
105. Moreover, the knowledge that sight-review procedures are in effect may well
have deterred forgery or alteration. Fraudsters, "unlike rivers, microbes, and other
nonhuman subjects of government regulation, are conscious entities, capable of engaging
in strategic behavior." Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, Orders and Incentives as
Regulatory Methods: The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, 35 UCLA L. REV.
1115, 1168 (1988) (noting that if a rule applies only to checks over $5000, the thief will
respond by writing a bad check for $4999). Cooter and Rubin argue that a pricing
mechanism is the best solution to the funds availability problem and the best way to
implement the EFAA. Id. at 1173.
106. The American Bankers Association recognizes the risks inherent in check
truncation. "These risks are similar to those encountered in bulk filing. One difference
between truncation and bulk filing might be that forgers may not yet understand bulk
filing techniques but, because of publicity, will understand truncation." GERALD A.
GOODWIN, How TO EVALUATE AND IMPLEMENT CHECK SAFEKEEPING A-1I (n.d.).
107. Telephone Interview with Joseph Madison, consultant and expert witness on
electronic funds transfers (June 4, 1991).
108. Revised § 3-103(a)(4) introduces a standard of good faith that banks must meet,
but the standard is linked to fairness, not to ordinary care. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) &
cmt. 4 (1990).
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examine checks whenever the failure to do so would increase
the risk of forgery or alteration' °9 or whenever the costs of
examination are below the losses anticipated by reason of
forged or altered checks.11 0 Moreover, although it may be
commercially reasonable not to examine every check, it should
not be permissible for the bank to escape responsibility for
choosing a system that may be less costly to the bank but very
costly to the individual customer. " What constitutes ordinary
care should include an evaluation of the commercial reason-
ableness of the activity, but ordinary care should not be swal-
lowed by commercial reasonableness. The risk of loss should
be shared, as the revised Code suggests, between a negligent
bank and a negligent customer, but the principles of compar-
ative negligence should not be undermined by distorting the
meaning of ordinary care. The tension between honoring the
bank's duty to its customer, measured by its exercise of
ordinary care, and the bank's duty to itself or to its full array
of customers, measured by the commercial reasonableness of
its activities, should not result in a sacrifice of one duty to the
other. Rather, a balance should be struck that enables the
bank to satisfy its multiple obligations and to serve justly all
of its constituencies. Implementing the comparative negli-
gence standard in revised Article Three strikes that balance,
but not if the standard of ordinary care effectively precludes
a finding of bank negligence.
III. EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT AND TORT THEORIES OF
LIABILITY FROM TRADITIONAL TO MODERN BANK PRACTICES
To a large extent, the burden of paper coupled with techno-
logical relief propelled changes in the banking law and
109. The risk may be increased because of the absence of any deterrent function that
signature examination provides or because there is no physical check that the customer
may examine after payment has been made.
110. Losses suffered by anyone should be considered, not just those losses that a bank
may suffer in terms of its liability.
111. The efficient breach theory does not account for the customer's enforcement costs
and the presence of these costs may preclude an action by the customer, thereby
removing the economic discipline on the inefficient breach. Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining
Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of "Obsolete" Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 557
(1991).
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mandated a reevaluation of loss allocation policies.112 Loss
allocation, of course, presupposes liability. Bank liability may
be established under the Code and under common-law princi-
ples.'13 For example, the payment of a forged or altered check
creates a claim under section 4-401 of the Code," 4 constitutes
a breach of the bank's contract with its customer and also may
give rise to a cause of action for conversion under the Code." 5
While the former Code used traditional tort principles to
determine a bank's liability, 116 the revised Code explicitly
adopted comparative negligence principles to reallocate
losses." 7 The revised Code preserves the analytical structures
of contract and tort principles but redefines certain elements
so that traditional expectations no longer are valid. These
constructs will now be examined, followed by an analysis of
the redefined components.
112. Telephone Interview with Professor Robert Jordan, Co-Reporter and drafter of
revised U.C.C. Articles Three and Four (June 2, 1991).
113. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990) (stating that unless displaced by particular provisions
common law may supplement Code provisions). The common-law action for "money had
and received,- for example, survived enactment of the Code. See, e.g., Peerless Ins. Co.
v. Texas Commerce Bank, 791 F.2d 1177,1181 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the common-
law action survived and that a forged indorsement is ineffective to pass title to a
collecting bank). Unlike an action under the Code, the defenses of "good faith" and ad-
herence to "reasonable commercial standards" are not available under the common law
action for money had and received. The bank may assert laches, fault by the payee, or
ratification or authorization of the forged instrument as defenses to the common law
action. Id. at 1179; see also Hechter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 385 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y.
1978) (holding that the payee could recover from the depositary bank on the theory that
the depositary bank acquired no title to a check on which the indorsement had been
forged). But see Moore v. Richmond Hill Say. Bank, 502 N.Y.S.2d 202, 208 (App. Div.
1986) (denying recovery by the payee from the depositary bank).
114. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990); U.C.C. § 4-401(1) (1989); see also Perini Corp. v. First
Natl Bank, 553 F.2d 398,403 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that an item with a forged indorse-
ment is not "properly payable" under § 4-401 and may not be charged to a customer's
account); Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 546 N.E.2d
904, 906 (N.Y. 1989); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. American Express Co., 542
N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (N.Y. 1989).
115. U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (1990); U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) (1989); see also Kuwait Airways
v. American Sec. Bank N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (allowing the defense
of contributory negligence to a conversion claim).
116. See Hanover Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 505 (D.
Kan. 1979) (rejecting the argument that the bank had no duty "under the U.C.C., or
otherwise, to examine items for alterations of the payee").
117. See U.C.C. §§ 3-306, 4-406 (1990).
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A. The Contractual and Commercial Code Relationship
The underlying relationship between a bank and its
customer is the contractual one of debtor and creditor.
118
Fundamental to this relationship is the agreement that the
bank may not debit a customer's account without that
customer's authorization.'19 This understanding of the bank's
obligation and liability is essential to the negotiability of
checks because the customer needs to know that the bank will
withdraw money from the account only upon the customer's,
and no one else's, instruction. 120 The bank's liability protects
the customer from risks after the check leaves the customer's
control. Placing liability on the bank seems equitable because
the bank has final control before executing the order of
payment and can prevent loss by reviewing and confirming
the customer's order. 121 If the customer's authorized signature
118. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. NCNB National Bank, 695 F.
Supp. 162, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 872 F.2d (1984). The bank is the debtor of the
depositor for the money deposited. See Danning v. Bank of Am., 199 Cal. Rptr. 163, 167
(Ct. App. 1984). Articles Three and Four import Federal Reserve regulations and
operating circulars, clearinghouse rules, and the like into the contractual obligations
between the parties, whether or not the parties are signatories thereto. See U.C.C. § 4-
103(b) & cmt. 3 (1990). While this provision also was part of the former Code, it will
become much more significant in light of the comparative negligence provisions and the
new standard of ordinary care. See id. § 4-102(a) (subordinating Article Three to Article
Four in the event of a conflict between the provisions).
119. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 695 F. Supp. at 164 (holding that
the indorsement was effective and that the drawee was liable for having failed to honor
the drawer's order). Former § 4-401(1) authorized a bank to charge the account of its
customer for any item which is "properly payable" from that account. See U.C.C. § 4-
401(1) (1989). Revised § 4-401(1) similarly authorizes the bank, but adds that "[an
item is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in accordance with
any agreement between the customer and the bank." See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990). This
flexibility to redefine what is properly payable by modifying the agreements between
the parties potentially may result in nonuniform practices. It is more likely, however,
to alter the bank's obligations significantly, thereby effectively precluding a customer
from even asserting a prima facie case against the bank for negligence.
120. Brigham v. McCabe, 232 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1967); see also Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 442 N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (N.Y. 1982)
(stating that a bank is to apply funds in the drawer's account for check payment only
upon receiving the payee's authorized indorsement).
121. See, e.g., First Natl Bank v. Plymouth-Home Natl Bank, 553 F. Supp. 448,
450-51 (D. Mass. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1983); Girard Bank v. Mount Holly
State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1230-31 (D.N.J. 1979).
FALL 1992] Negligent Banks
is not on the check,"2 the bank is not authorized to pay the
check. 2" Nor may a bank properly pay an item containing a
forged indorsement."2 Payment of a forged check is a breach
of the bank's agreement to pay out funds only upon the
customer's authorization. To meet their contractual obliga-
tions, banks visually inspected each check for evidence of
forgery or alteration that would interfere with the customer's
authorization to pay.125
If payment nevertheless is made on a check that is not
properly payable, the payment is deemed to have been made
solely from the funds of the drawee bank 12 rather than from
those of its customer.'27 In the event that the bank has paid
a check improperly, the bank must recredit the customer's ac-
count 2" and bear the loss 29 unless it can establish facts which
would preclude the customer from asserting the forgery or
122. Under the former Code, the customer is not liable on the check if the signature
is not authorized unless the customer ratifies the signature or is precluded from raising
this defense. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (1989). The definition of"signature" is broader under
the revised Code and now specifically includes mechanical means of making a signature.
U.C.C. § 3-401(b) (1990). Furthermore, an authorized signature may be that of an
authorized representative of the customer and no longer must be the customer's own
signature. Id. § 3-401(a).
123. U.C.C. § 4-401 (1990); U.C.C. § 4-401 (1989).
124. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 1 (1990). An "indorsement" is a signature of a person other
than the drawer of the check that, with or without other words, is made on the check
to negotiate the check, restrict payment, or to incur liability on the check. See id. § 3-
204(a). Former Article Three did not define indorsement. Where an indorsement has
been forged, one of the parties must bear the risk of loss. For an excellent comparison
of the way in which common- and civil-law systems resolve risk allocation, see William
C. Vis, Forged Indorsements, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 547 (1979).
125. The legend on the check "Pay to the order of' authorized the bank to pay. Such
an explicit instruction is not requiredunder the revised Code. Compare U.C.C. §§ 3-109,
3-110 (1990) with U.C.C. §§ 3-110, 3-111 (1989).
126. While the term "drawee bank" is not defined in the Code, it frequently is used
to refer to the drawer's bank, which is more formally known as the "payor bank." See
U.C.C. § 4-105(3) (1990).
127. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. ChemicalBank, 442 N.E.2d 1253,
1258 (N.Y. 1982).
128. See JAMES J. WRITE &ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-3
(3d ed. 1988).
129. Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d
624, 625-26 (Tenn. 1987). It is possible for the payor bank to shift its loss to the
depositary bank under a breach of warranty theory under former §§ 3-417(1) and 4-
207(1)(a), (c), or it may have recourse against the person whom it paid, including a
collecting bank, for the breach ofwarranties under §§ 3-417(1)(a) and 4-207(1 )(a). U.C.C.
§§ 3-417(1)(a), 4-207(1)(a) (1990); U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1), 4-207(1)(a), (c) (1989).
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alteration against the bank, 3 ' because the bank is strictly
liable under its debtor-creditor contract.'
13
B. Strict Liability and Negligence in Tort
The bank also may be held liable under a traditional tort
analysis. Each bank owes a duty to its customer to comply
with the customer's order with respect to the payment of
checks drawn on the customer's account.' 2 The bank breaches
that duty if it fails to pay according to the customer's order.'3
This is a form of strict liability, wherein the act of wrongful
payment constitutes the breach,"3 whether or not payment
appears to be justified, such as in the case of a perfect
forgery. 135 This-of course-also is consistent with contract
theory. The bank breaches its contractual obligation if the
bank pays a check upon a forged signature rather than upon
. 130. The customer's negligence precludes the customer from bringing a claim against
the bank for the forgery or alteration. Compare U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990) (stating that
a person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributes to an alteration
or forgery of an instrument is precluded from asserting the forgery or alteration against
a person who in good faith pays the instrument) with U.C.C. § 3-406(1)(d) (1989) (stating
that a person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material alteration
of an instrument or the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting
the alteration or lack of authority against a drawee or other payor who pays the
instrument in good faith).
131. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 546 N.E.2d
904, 906 (N.Y. 1989); see also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. American Express Co.,
542 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (N.Y. 1989) (stating that a bank and its depositor have the
contractual relationship of debtor and creditor with the implicit understanding that the
bank will pay out the depositor's funds only in accordance with its instructions).
132. The bank has "an absolute duty not to pay unauthorized drafts." Wilder Binding
Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 527 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 552 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 1990).
133. Payment of unauthorized drafts, even in good faith, violates the duty to pay
only those checks that are "properly payable and failure to exercise ordinary care
precludes the bank from asserting the customer's negligence." Wilder Binding Co., 527
N.E.2d at 358.
134. Barberv. United States Nat'l Bank, 750 P.2d 1183, 1185-86 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
135. A "perfect forgery" is one which is undetectable without the use of mechanical
devices. An example of a perfect forgery is one in which the signature of the indorser
matches the name of the payee, but is not by the person intended to receive the check.
For example, the insurance company draws a check to "Sarah Smith" but by mistake
mails the check to a different "Sarah Smith" in another city. The Sarah Smith who
indorsed the check has forged the indorsement of the intended payee. See U.C.C. § 3-406
cmt. 3 (1990).
150
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the customer's own signature. 136  Under either a theory of
breach of contract or of strict liability in tort, the loss would
fall on the bank.
Exclusive application of a strict liability rule, however,
would impose liability on the bank even if the loss is caused
by the customer's negligence. To mitigate this harshness, the
former Code introduced principles of tort duty and estoppel
to reallocate the loss more equitably.1 37 The former Code
permitted estoppel to preclude the assertion of a contract
claim and allowed negligence to override the estoppel. 1 8 A
customer whose negligence "substantially contributes" 139 to
the forgery or alteration is precluded from asserting the
forgery against a bank, even though the bank breached the
contract and paid the forged or altered check. 40 Thus, if the
bank breached its contract but showed that the customer was
negligent, the loss would fall on the customer.' If, however,
136. See supra notes 118-131 and accompanying text. Paying a forged check is not
the only way that a bank may breach its contract with its customer. For instance, in
Your Style Publications, Inc. v. Mid Town Bank & Trust, 501 N.E.2d 805 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 738 (Ill. 1987), the court remanded to find whether
the payor bank breached its contract with its depositor by not giving the full amount
of the check to the payee when the payee cashed the depositor's check and the payor
bank deducted a service fee. Id. at 810.
137. These principles first were enunciated in the former Code by Professor William
L. Prosser, who was the Reporter for Article Three and the preeminent expert on torts.
For interesting details on Professor Prosser's involvement with Article Three, see Donald
J. Rapson, Loss Allocation in Forgery and Fraud Cases: Significant Changes Under
Revised Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 435, 448 n.50 (1991).
138. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989).
139. The substantial contribution test under both revised and former U.C.C. § 3-406
is the equivalent of the substantial factor test applied in the law of negligence generally.
Dominion Constr. Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 315 A.2d 69, 74 (Md. 1974). Causation is
proved more easily under this test than under the "direct and proximate cause" test.
Id. at 73-74. A leading case contrasting "substantially contributes" with "direct and
proximate cause" as the test for causation is Thompson Maple Prods. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 234 A.2d 32, 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967).
140. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990); U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989); see also Robert M. Lewis, Note,
Allocation of Loss Due to Fraudulent Wholesale Wire Transfers: Is There a Negligence
Action Against a Beneficiary's Bank After Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code?,
90 MICH. L. REv. 2565, 2583-84 (1992) (describing the allocation of losses under the
comparative negligence framework of Articles Three and Four). The negligent party
is estopped from raising the forgery against the bank, but is not liable in tort for
damages resulting from the alteration. See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 1 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-406
cmt. 5 (1989).
141. The negligent drawer is "precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of
authority" against a person who "pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance
with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payors business." U.C.C.
§ 3-406 (1989). Revised § 3-406 broadened the category of persons who may invoke the
preclusion against the customer to include any person who, "in good faith, pays the
instrument or takes it for value or for collection." U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990).
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the customer then proved that the bank was negligent in
having paid the check, the preclusion no longer would apply
and the bank would bear the loss.
1 2
Recasting the theory of the bank's liability from strict
liability to negligence transferred the focus under the Code
from the contractual nature of the bank's obligations to both
a consideration of the bank's duty and a balancing of the
factors that determine whether due care has been exercised.
4 3
In a tort analysis, the bank owes the customer a duty to
exercise due care in processing the checks. The bank could
meet this standard of care by reviewing the signature and the
indorsements on the check to determine whether the customer,
and not an impostor, had ordered payment. If the bank failed
to properly review the checks or failed to discover the
customer's lack of authorization before payment, the bank
breached its duty to use due care.' Through following proper
sight-review procedures, the bank could recognize the forged
signature or alteration, not pay the check, and avoid loss to
the customer. In this fashion, the former Code imposed
liability for a loss caused to the customer by a bank's failure
to review checks, not under a theory of strict liability in tort,
but by application of contract principles and a negligence
theory of tort liability. 145
The bank's ability to meet the standard of care and the
soundness of this negligence theory in practice depends upon
the validity of fundamental assumptions. For instance,
142. Under the revised Code, the loss would then be allocated between the bank and
the customer. U.C.C. § 3-406(b) (1990).
143. In contract, the duty is established directly between specific parties in a binding
personal relationship before any dispute or breach arises. In tort, the relationship
between the parties arises as a result of the breach, not a priori. See Palsgrafv. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). The dissent in
American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. Isaac, 636 P.2d 1296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981), affd,
675 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1984), criticized the majority for proceeding on general negligence
principles instead of on contract principles, asserting that the relationship between the
depositor and the bank is fundamentally one of contract. Id. at 1299 (Berman, J.,
dissenting); see also BARKLEY CLARKE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSIS, COLLECIONS AND CREDIT
CARDS $ 2.1[2] (Cumulative Supp. No. 31989) (discussing the Isaac case). Under contract
theory, the duty to honor only properly payable items does not hinge on negligence but
arises from the contract between the bank and the depositor.
144. See, e.g., Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329, 332 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding the bank negligent for not having any procedures to detect
unauthorized signatures).
145. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501,509-10
(D. Kan. 1979) (holding the bank liable as the proximate cause of the loss for having
failed to recognize "conspicuous" alterations).
152
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requiring a bank to review the signatures on checks presented
for payment presumes that a forgery or alteration will be
detected. 4 " This assumption itself presumes that the
signature on the check will be compared with the signature
card on file for the customer and that the forgery will be
discovered through such a comparison. 47 Because of the sheer
volume of paper checks that it faces, the banking industry
already has challenged the assumption that sight-review
procedures will necessarily lead to discovery of forgery or
alteration. The most fundamental assumption of all, that
there is a paper check to be inspected, will be refuted by the
advent of electronic presentment of checks in which no paper
will proceed through the system. 48
Throughout the industry, banks have determined that the
risk to the bank of incurring losses from the payment of forged
or altered checks of a low dollar amount is less than the costs
of sight-review procedures which would prevent the losses
from occurring."' Applying the Learned Hand formula for
balancing benefits and burdens, the expense of reviewing
every check outweighs the benefit of discovering those few
checks on which the signature may be forged. 5 0 Consequent-
ly, the traditional banking practice of sight review has yielded
to the modern practice of limited sight review where the
aggregate savings outweigh the probable losses for any
individual case. By this decision not to sight review checks,
the banks consciously have exposed themselves to liability to
146. See, e.g., Medford Irrigation Dist., 676 P.2d at 329 (holding that the bank failed
to exercise ordinary care or follow reasonable commercial practices by paying all checks
under $5000 without any procedures to detect forgeries).
147. See, e.g., Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 155 (Conn.
1976). That the examination of signature cards to determine the genuineness of indorse-
ments may not be practical does not necessarily relieve banks of the risk of loss from
payment on forged checks. Id. Under the revised Code, a person may be bound, even
if his signature does not appear on the check, if the person who signed the instrument
is an agent of the person whose check is signed. U.C.C. §§ 3-401(a)(ii), 3-402(a) (1990)
(significantly expanding the liability of the person whose check is used).
148. See supra part II.
149. See infra part V.A (discussing limited sight review).
150. See New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Northern Barge Corp. (The T.J. Hooper),
60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir.) (applying what has come to be known as the Learned Hand
Formula), cert. denied sub nor. Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S.
662 (1932); see also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(explicitly presenting the Learned Hand Formula).
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the customer in the event that forged checks are paid.1 51 This
decision to incur liability for an "efficient breach" may be
commercially reasonable, but at the same time it respects the
underlying contractual obligation to the customer because the
breaching party shoulders the liability for its commercially
reasonable decision to breach.152
The revised Code, however, effectively shields the bank from
liability for breaching its contract by equating a"commercially
reasonable" decision with the exercise of ordinary care.
Through operation of the definition of "ordinary care," the
revised Code eliminates the bank's obligation to conduct sight
review. 15 Because the discontinuation of sight review is not
linked to a dollar-value of the check, or to any balancing of
the benefits and burdens," 4 the revised Code reduces the
incentive to make cost-effective decisions and ultimately
disrespects the contractual agreement between the bank and
its customer. 155 Because the revisions insulate the banks from
151. Cf David J. Leibson, Handling Re-Presented Checks-Risky Business for
Collecting and Payor Banks, 72 KY. L.J. 549, 557 (1983-84) (pointing out that a bank's
decision to re-present a dishonored check without notifying the customer of the dishonor
may be economically feasible, but is "no reason to insulate a bank from any loss caused
by its failure to give notice").
152. It is inherent in the efficient breach theory that the market, not the courts,
determines when the breach is appropriate, because a breach is efficient only when the
market provides a superior alternative to performance of the obligation under the
contract. Robinson, supra note 111, at 547. Achieving an optimum allocation of
resources, which is key to the theory of an efficient breach, requires avoiding
undercompensation as well as overcompensation. Applied to this situation, if the
customer is undercompensated and suffers a loss and if the bank does not bear the full
cost of its breach, the bank is encouraged to engage in a breach that produces an
economically inefficient reallocation of resources. By systematically undercompensating
customers without the bank bearing the full cost of its breach, as, for example, when
the customer is made to bear the loss incurred by the bank's decision not to sight review
checks, the revisions risk encouraging too much breach, and too much loss, rather than
too little. See John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages inActions Based
upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1565, 1572 (1986).
153. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
154. See id. § 3-103(7) cmt. 5.
155. As discussed earlier, the bank's contractual agreement to pay only according
to the order of the customer simultaneously creates the bank's tort obligation. See supra
notes 137-145 and accompanying text. Ifthe bank can escape this obligation by altering
the meaning of the standard of care, it affects fundamental expectations under the
contract. Not reviewing the checks eviscerates the bank's ability to fulfill its obligations,
contrary to the expectations of the customer. Query whether not disclosing this material
fact could give rise to a tort claim against the bank by the customer separate from the
actual claim of breach of the underlying obligation. But see Spokane Valley State Bank
v. Lutes, 233 P. 308,310 (Wash. 1925) (findingthat the bank was not required to disclose
the manner of collection, or that it had accepted a draft from the issuing bank instead
of cash).
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their negligence through the change in the meaning of "ordi-
nary care," customers now will bear losses that used to be
borne by the banks under the former Code. Thus, even though
comparative negligence principles now are imported into
revised Article Three, the new interpretation of "ordinary
care" dramatically diminishes the bank's contractual obliga-
tions to its customers.15
Moreover, the revised Code ignores the central purpose of
a comparative negligence system, which is to distribute the
loss equitably between negligent parties in proportion to their
share in causing the harm. 157 Statutorily protecting the bank's
conduct undermines the equitablejustification for introducing
comparative loss provisions to the Code because it effectively
prevents the customer from proving bank negligence. The
evolution from theories of strict liability in contract or tort to
comparative negligence rules theoretically may distribute
losses more fairly, but in practice will reallocate losses from
negligent banks to negligent customers. Banks, then, will be
the beneficiaries of the new comparative negligence provisions.
C. The Convergence of Tort and Contract in Conversion
The broader use of tort principles to expand benefits to
banks in one context is at odds with the stricter application
of contract principles to limit customers' options in another.
156. Arguably,thebank'sgoodofaithobligations, codifiedin§ 3-103(a)(4),willpromote
bank practices that minimize risk of loss to customers because ofeither bank competition
or a heightened sense of business ethics. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990). A companion
argument also can be advanced: that banks will develop screening techniques because
they do not know in advance which customers will be negligent (thus shielding the bank
from liability) and which will not be (thus exposing the bank to some liability). While
these hopes may be realized, consumers nevertheless are left without the legal artillery
to expedite these developments and without much of an effective remedy if these reforms
fail to materialize. Furthermore, because it will be far easier under the revised Code
for banks to establish customer negligence, bank exposure to liability will be far less
of a motivating force for change than optimists predict.
157. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 67, at 470-72. Revised §§ 3-405(b) and 3-404(d)
both state that "the person bearing the loss may recover from the person failing to
exercise ordinary care to the extent the failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to
the loss." The person "bearing the loss" is the customer. The language of the provision
indicates that the customer bears the primary responsibility for loss in the context of
forgery or alteration caused by a person within the customer's employment. The
customer will be able to recover only that portion of the loss which the customer can
prove was caused by the bank's negligence. See U.C.C. §§ 3-403(b), 3-404(d) (1990).
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Banks are gaining ground as the tort aspects of conversion"s
seem to give way to stricter contract standards that will limit
a customer's litigation options. Under the former Code, it was
unclear whether the drawer of a check on which the indorse-
ment was forged could assert rights directly against a
depositary bank that had converted the check.'59 The revised
Code prevents the drawer from bringing a suit directly against
the depositary bank 6 ° because, in the opinion of the drafters
of the Code, the drawer already has an adequate remedy.
16 1
The drawer could enforce its contract against the payor bank
to recredit the drawer's account for unauthorized payment of
the check.112  The payor bank then could recover from the
depositary bank for the losses caused by the latter's wrongful
payment of a forged indorsement. 16
Under the foimer Code, the loss usually fell upon the
depositary bank" 4 because it had converted the instrument
by taking it from the forger. 165  Under the standards of the
revised Code, however, the customer effectively may be
158. A bank maybe liable in conversion for paying an instrunent that bears a forged
indorsement. "[A]n instrument is converted if it is taken by transfer other than a
negotiation" or "for collection or payment from a person not entitled to enforce the instru-
ment or receive payment." See U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (1990). Conversion was covered
under former § 3-419. See U.C.C. § 3-419 (1989).
159. Compare Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Int'l Co., 873 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the drawer had standing to bring a negligence suit against the
depositary bank) with Moore v. Richmond Hill Say. Bank, 502 N.Y.S.2d 202, 208 (App.
Div. 1986) (holding that a depositary or collecting bank in most circumstances is not
liable to the rightful payee of the stolen draft for paying out funds on an instrument
over the forged indorsement of the plaintiff payee's signature).
160. U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (1990). This also is based on the asymmetric defenses at the
depositary bank's disposal; see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 128, § 15-4; see also Stone
& Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 184 N.E.2d 358, 364 (Mass. 1962)
(denying the drawer the right to enforce a claim against the collecting bank).
161. See U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (1990) (stating that "[tihere is no reason why a drawer
should have an action in conversion").
162. See id.
163. The revised Code adopted the rule ofStone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 184 N.E.2d
at 362, which forbids the drawer to bring a conversion action, but noted that an action
by the drawer against the collecting bank might have some "theoretical appeal as
avoiding circuity of action" where the collecting bank is liable to the drawee and the
drawee is liable to the drawer. U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (1990).
164. Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Int'l Co., 873 F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1989)
(stating that the loss usually falls on the first party to accept the check). Depositary
bank liability presumes, of course, that the forger is not available for recovery.
165. The general rule offormerU.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) iscarried overinto revisedU.C.C.
§ 3-420. See U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (1990). For a discussion of conversion, see Lary Lawrence,
Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Suggested
Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 115 (1983).
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precluded from recovering from the payor bank because of the
customer's virtual inability to establish the bank's negli-
gence.'6 If the payor bank is not liable to the drawer, there
is no incentive for the payor bank to institute an action
against the depositary bank. Therefore, if the drawer is
precluded from recovering from the payor bank and no longer
has the option to sue the depositary bank, the drawer
effectively is left without a remedy and will bear the loss.
Under the revised Code, then, the loss actually is more likely
to fall on the customer than on the depositary bank.
The revised Code removes the option to sue the depositary
bank not only from the drawer but from certain payees as
well. 167 Formerly, courts were divided on whether a payee who
had never received the check from the drawer could bring an
action in conversion against the depositary bank.'16 Reasoning
that a payee still had a cause of action against the payor for
the underlying transaction, the drafters could find no reason
to allow the payee to sue the depositary bank directly.' 9 The
removal of the drawer's and payee's option to bring a direct
action against the depositary bank impliedly resurrects the
defense of the lack of privity of contract. 7 °
166. See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
167. A payee who received the check from the drawer and was thereafter injured
by a forgery, as, for example, where a thief stole the check from the payee and then
forged the payee's indorsement, still may bring a conversion action under the revised
Code. See U.C.C. § 3-420 (1990).
168. Compare Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 477 A.2d 806, 816 (N.J.
1984) (holding that the depositary bank acted in a reasonable manner in accepting the
forged indorsement because it dealt with the customer and not the forger) and Moore
v. Richmond Hill Say. Bank, 502 N.Y.S.2d 202, 208 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that the
depositary bank was not liable to the payee in conversion or for the common-law action
of money had and received) with Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609, 618 (Cal. 1973)
(holding that the collecting bank was liable to payee for conversion where the payee was
not negligent in failing to receive the check) and Hechter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 385
N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that a valid cause of action exists when a bank
collects an instrument over a forged indorsement).
169. U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (1990) (stating that "there is no reason to give any
additional remedy to the payee" because the payee still may enforce the underlying
obligation). This view does not consider the consequences to a payee of the payor's
insolvency. The "additional" remedy of suing the depositary bank directly could be
valuable to the payee if the error was not discovered and corrected prior to the payor's
bankruptcy.
170. Traditional negotiability doctrine contractually obligated drawers of checks to
holders of checks even in the absence of direct privity. Weinberg, supra note 104, at
592.
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IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE TO
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Code recognizes circumstances in which a bank may
avoid strict liability for its payment of forged or altered
checks. 17' Generally, under the former Code, the loss caused
by forged signatures on negotiable instruments fell on the
person who forged the instrument or on the first party who
took the instrument from the forger." This general rule did
not apply if the drawer negligently created the opportunity
for the forgery or failed to take reasonable precautions to
prevent subsequent forgeries, unless the bank also was
negligent. 7 3 The revised Code continues these basic excep-
tions but increases the scope of their application and changes
the distribution of the loss.
A. Revised Articles Three and Four Introduce
Loss-Sharing Provisions
The revised Code provides that the loss may be shifted from
one party to the other, 74 may be reduced by the amount of loss
caused by the other,175 or may be shared in proportion to the
degree of negligence of the respective parties.' 76 To impose
liability on the customer under sections 3-404, 3-405,'7 or 4-406,
171. For an excellent discussion of "Three Basic Cases" of forgery and the loss
allocation theories applied under the former and revised Codes, see Rapson, supra note
137.
172. Cf. Perini Corp. v. First Natl Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 403-04 (5th Cir. 1977)
(involving a double forgery in which the defrauder not only invented the payee at the
drawing stage but also indorsed the check in the collection stage). But cf. Brighton, Inc.
v. Colonial First Nat'l Bank, 422 A.2d 433,437-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), affd,
430 A.2d 902 (1981) (involving a double forgery in which the claim based on forged signa-
tures was barred by invoking the statute of limitations provision of former § 4-406(4)
as a substantive provision of law).
173. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989). The drawer was not precluded from raising the § 4-401
improper payment claim if the bank also was negligent. See id.
174. U.C.C. §§ 3-404 to 3-406, 4-406 (1990).
175. Id. §§ 3-404, 3-405, 4-406.
176. Id. § 3-406.
177. Revised §§ 3-404 and 3-405 cover the subject matter of former § 3-405. They
include fraud through use of an impostor, fictitious payees, and padded payrolls. See
iii §§ 3-404, 3-405. While former § 3-405 had been silent on the issue of negligence, revised
§§ 3-404 and 3-405 impose loss on the employer without regard to the employer's
negligence. See id. §§ 3-404, 3-405; U.C.C. § 3-405 (1989).
FALL 1992] Negligent Banks
the bank need only show that the customer failed to comply
with certain obligations 178 or that the indorsement was effective
against the customer. 9 Thus, the customer may be strictly
liable under revised sections 3-404, 3-405, and 4-406 without
regard to the specific circumstances of the customer's exercise
of due care."8 The customer then may reduce the amount of
loss under those sections to the extent that the customer can
prove that the bank was negligent and that the bank's negli-
gence substantially contributed to the loss. 8' As revised,
sections 3-404 and 3-405 state that "the person bearing the
loss [the customer] may recover from the person failing to
exercise ordinary care [the bank] to the extent the failure to
exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss. "1"
178. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-406 (1990) (imposing the duty to examine the checks or bank
statement and to notify the bank of "unauthorized payments" that the customer "should
reasonably have discovered"). Revised § 4-406 increased the customer's obligations from
those under former § 4-406, which merely required the customer to notify the bank of
any forgery or alteration that the customer discovered. Compare id- with U.C.C. § 4-406
(1989).
179. Revised § 3-405 makes the indorsementofa faithless employee effective to bind
the customer if the customer entrusted the employee with certain responsibilities, even
if the customer exercised ordinary care in the selection, supervision, and control of its
employee. U.C.C. § 3-405 (1990); see also id. § 3-404 (stating that the indorsement of
an impostor will be effective even if the impostor tricked the customer to make the check
payable to the impostor). The effect of the customer's exercise of ordinary care was unre-
solved under the former Code.
180. Former § 4-406 merely required the customer to exercise reasonable care. See
U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989). In some measure, it is helpful that the revision articulated
specific obligations informing the customer of how to avoid liability. Liability for
noncompliance without any flexibility for consideringthe reasonableness ofthe customers
behavior under the circumstances, however, increases the probability that the customer
will be liable for losses. For example, revised § 4-406 requires the customer to discover
and to report any unauthorized payments without taking into account such reasonable
excuses for delayed reporting as taking a vacation or irregular delivery of mail. See U.C.C.
§ 4-406 (1990).
181. U.C.C. §§ 3-406(b), 4-406(e) (1990); see also East Gadsden Bank v. First City
Nat'l Bank, 281 So. 2d 431, 435-36 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973) (requiring the payor bank to
prove that the drawer caused the loss by showing that the bank relied on the drawer's
negligent act or that the drawer affirmatively induced the bank to accept the forged instru-
ment).
182. U.C.C. §§ 3-404, 3-405 (1990). The former Code left to the courts the issue of
whether a negligence standard applied to shift the loss. See, e.g., Commercial Cotton
Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553-54 (Ct. App. 1985) (placing the loss
on the bank); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. NCND National
Bank, 695 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the bank was not negligent in
accepting a check issued to a fictitious payee and containing language to name the payee
so that the proceeds could be deposited), affd, 872 F.2d 1021 (1989). But see Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 442 N.E.2d 1253, 1259-60 (N.Y.
1982) (Cooke, C.J., concurring) (stating that the omission of a negligence standard in
former § 3-405 was intentional and calling for the revision of § 3-405).
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Like sections 3-404 and 3-405, revised section 4-406 invokes
strict liability principles to impose the loss on the customer. 183
Unlike sections 3-404 and 3-405, however, revised section 4-
406 compares the relative contributions of the customer's non-
compliance and the bank's negligence in causing the loss.
"[T]he loss is allocated between the customer... and the bank
... according to the extent to which the failure of the
customer to comply with subsection [4-406](c) and the failure
of the bank to exercise ordinary care contributed to the
loss. " 1 4 Because it weighs the bank's negligence against the
customer's noncompliance with statutory obligations, section
4-406 can be considered to apply a comparative negligence
standard only if the customer's noncompliance is denominated
as negligence per se as opposed to a breach of the customer's
contractual obligations.185
By contrast, revised section 3-406 states that the loss is
allocated between the customer and the bank "according to
the extent to which the failure of each to exercise ordinary
care contributed to the loss. "n1 Only in section 3-406 is the
exercise of ordinary care an essential component of negligence
for both parties, the bank and the customer. Only revised
section 3-406, therefore, articulates true comparative
negligence principles to allocate the loss between the bank and
the customer in proportion to their respective degrees of
negligence.
183. Compare U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989) (requiring the customer to "exercise reasonable
care and promptness to examine the statement and items") withU.C.C. § 4-406(c) (1990)
(disallowing the flexible standard of care and requiring the customer to "exercise
reasonable promptness in examining the statement or items"). Under the former Code,
the customer received the checks as well as the bank statement, U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989);
under the revised Code, banks need only provide the bank statement, U.C.C. § 4-406(c)
(1990).
184. U.C.C. § 4-406(e) (1990). If the customer proves that the bank failed to exercise
good faith in paying the check, the customer is free to assert the forgery or alteration
against the bank. Id.
185. In the tort law setting, courts find parties negligent per se for statutory
violations if they proximately caused an injury to a person protected by the statute. See,
e.g., Davidson v. Williams, 235 N.E.2d 90, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968) (Faulconer, J.,
dissenting); Schmitt v. Clayton County, 284 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 1979); Hayes v.
Hagemeier, 400 P.2d 945, 947 (N.M. 1963).
186. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1990).
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B. Section 3-406 Applies Comparative Negligence
Principles to Allocate the Loss
As just noted, revised section 3-406 adopts comparative
negligence principles to allocate loss between a negligent
customer and a negligent bank." 7 Initially, revised section
3-406(a) permits a bank to preclude a drawer-customer from
asserting its breach of contract claim if the customer
substantially contributed"s to an alteration or to the making
of a forged signature.'" Thus, by application of estoppel
principles, section 3-406 initially imposes the loss from pay-
ment of a forged or altered check on a customer if the
customer's negligence substantially contributed to the forgery
or alteration. For example, a bank may estop the customer
from holding the bank responsible for losses caused by the
forgery or alteration if the customer wrote the check in a
manner that made it easy for someone else to alter either the
amount ' 9° or the payee.' 9 ' The effectiveness of the estoppel,
187. Id. § 3-406(b).
188. See supra note 139 (discussing substantial contribution). The "substantial
contribution" causation test also applies to §§ 3-404(d) and 3-405(b). U.C.C. §§ 3-404(d),
3-405(b) (1990); see id. § 3-406 cmt. 2.
189. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990). Compare this with former § 3-406, which provides
substantially the same preclusion power to the banks as does revised § 3-406. See U.C.C.
§ 3-406 (1989). Revised § 3-406, however, does not require that the alteration be "materi-
al." See U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1990). This now may enable banks to exercise more easily
the preclusion power. The former Code, in contrast, explicitly referred to "negligence"
and used the broader term "unauthorized" instead of "forged," leaving the issue of
authorization to other sections of the Code. See U.C.C. §§ 3-307, 3-402, 3-406 cmt. 2
(1989).
190. The leading case in this area is Young v. Grote, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
In this case the husband left signed checks with his wife while he went on a trip. The
wife authorized a clerk at the office to complete the checks and to cash them after
showing them to the wife. The clerk, however, left enough room between the words to
change the amounts. Failure to notice the extra space was held to be negligent on the
part of the drawer, so the bank was not liable. 130 Eng. Rep. at 766. In Weiner v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y.S. 203 (1931), the drawer was illiterate in words, but not in figures.
The drawer had one of his employees complete the checks for the correct amount in
figures, but the amount in writing was for a larger amount. After the drawer signed
the checks, the employee raised the figures to match the written amounts and cashed
them. The court held that these facts created an "assisted misinterpretation" estoppel
in favor of the bank, which was not liable. 253 N.Y.S. at 208.
191. See Edelen v. Oakland Bank of Say., 178 P. 737, 737-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1918);
Trust Co. of Am. v. Conklin, 119 N.Y.S. 367,367-68 (1909). Both cases involved checks
which were signed by the customer while blank, filled out by an unauthorized party,
and cashed by the bank on which they were drawn. Under these facts, the courts held
that the banks were not liable because the customers were negligent. See Edelen, 178
P. at 738; Trust Co. of Am., 119 N.Y.S. at 369. In Dominion Constr. v. First Nat'l Bank,
FALL 1992]
162 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL 26:1
however, under the former and revised Codes, is conditioned
upon the bank itself having acted in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards of the banking business.
192
If the customer is negligent and the bank is not, the customer
will bear the loss.
193
For a negligent customer to reshift the liability to the bank,
the customer must prove both that the bank breached its
agreement when it paid the forged check contrary to the
customer's order and that the bank was negligent in paying
the item. 19' For the bank to escape liability, it would have to
show that the drawer was negligent, that the negligence
substantially caused the forgery, 95 and, in some cases under
the former Code, that the bank was not negligent. 196 In this
context, the revised standards for establishing ordinary care,
negligence, and commercial reasonableness are pivotal to the
imposition of, and freedom from, liability.
P. at 738; Trust Co. ofAm., 119 N.Y.S. at 369. In Dominion Constr. v. First Natl Bank,
315 A.2d 69 (Md. 1974), the check was not made properly payable to the joint payees,
so one of the two payees deposited it in its own account. The court held that the drawer
had been negligent and that the bank was not liable. Id. at 74-76.
Under common law, however, if the instrument could be altered without leavingtraces
that would be noticed by the ordinary person, the drawer was not necessarily held
responsible. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alteration of Instruments §§ 69-70 (1962).
192. See, e.g., Hermetic Refrigeration Co. v. Central Valley Nat'l Bank, Inc., 493 F.2d
476, 477 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the bank could not assert the defense of
contributory negligence because it failed to comply with the reasonable commercial
standards of the banking business).
193. If the customer and the bank both are negligent, former § 3-406 provides that
the bank will bear the loss. See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 6 (1989). Revised § 3-406, in theory,
distributes the loss between the negligent parties in proportion to their negligence. See
U.C.C. § 3-406(b) (1990). But see supra part IV.A (challenging the realistic outcome of
the comparative negligence plan because of the companion changes in the standard of
care).
194. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501,510
(D. Kan. 1979) (stating that the conspicuous nature of the payee alterations and the
bank's admission through its employees that it had no procedure for examining checks
regarding the payees were significant factors in finding that the bank failed to exercise
ordinary care so as to shift the liability from the negligent customer to the negligent
bank and that its negligence proximately caused the loss).
195. See, e.g., East Gadsden Bank v. First City Natl Bank, 281 So. 2d 431,435-36
(Ala. Civ. App. 1973) (requiring that the payor bank have relied on the drawer's negligent
act or that the drawer affirmatively induced the bank's acceptance of the forged
instrument before precluding the drawers recovery).
196. Former § 3-406 imposed the burden on the defendant banks to affirmatively
establish their own due care. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989); Perley v. Glastonbury Bank
& Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 155 (Conn. 1976). Generally, however, the burden of proving
negligence rests on the party asserting it and revised § 3-406 reflects that principle.
SeeU.C.C. § 3-406(c) (1990) (providing thatthe burden ofproving failure to exercise ordi-
nary care under U.C.C. § 3-406(a) is on the person asserting the preclusion or, under
subsection (b), on the person precluded).
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The new standards will render a negligent customer's
success far less likely under the revised Code than formerly.
For the customer to prove that the bank failed to exercise
ordinary care under section 3-406 of the revised Code, the
customer will have to prove what the industry custom is and
that the bank failed to observe it. Because the revised Code
defines "ordinary care" for banks and imposes the standard
of the industry as the standard of ordinary care for banks,1 9 7
the burden on the customer to overcome the statutorily
imposed presumption that the practice is reasonable will be
far more difficult to overcome now than it was under the
former Code. 198 Moreover, the bank may assert the customer's
breach of duty to a third person, the holder, to protect the
bank from loss caused by its payment of the instrument. 199
Even though there is no contract between the customer and
the holder of a check, the customer owes a duty to the holder
to exercise ordinary care with respect to the check.2'
Whereas, under the former Code, a negligent customer could
shift the entire loss to a negligent bank, under the revised
Code such a customer may, at best, be able to share the loss
with the bank. The customer, therefore, will invoke the
comparative negligence principles of section 3-406(b) to
minimize, but not to avoid, loss.
C. The Customer Must Exercise Ordinary Care
Under Section 3-406 to Avoid Loss-Sharing
The former Code did not require the drawer to take unusual
precautions to satisfy the duty to exercise ordinary care, but
197. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(7), 4-103(c) (1990). The attempt to shift the responsibility
to the customer through judicial means has met resistance in the courts. See, e.g.,
Hanover Ins. Cos., 482 F. Supp. at 509 ("Any shifting ofthis responsibility to the custom-
er must be accomplished by legislative action and not by a ruling of the court.").
198. See infra part V.
199. See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 1 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 2 (1989).
200. See U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 1 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 2 (1989). The holder of
the check is not necessarily the original payee. The holder who took the instrument may
be fully protected against a forgery or alteration and can treat the instrument as having
been issued in the altered form. U.C.C. § 3-407(c) (1990). The requirements for a holder
in due course are set forth in § 3-302. See id. § 3-302; U.C.C. § 3-302 (1989). Under
the revised Code, a person need not be a holder in due course to be able to enforce an
instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990).
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this no longer may be true under the revised Code.2"1 The
revised Code introduces a definition of "ordinary care" with
respect to a person engaged in business; it is the "observance
of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in
which the person is located, with respect to the business in
which the person is engaged." °2 But the definition does not
state what "ordinary care" means with respect to a customer
who is not in business. As a result, common-law principles
apply: the bank will establish a breach of the customer's duty
to exercise ordinary care by applying traditional negligence
principles under section 3-406.2o3 To preclude the customer
from asserting the bank's breach of contract, the bank must
prove that the customer did not comply with sections 3-404,
3-405, or 4-406. Courts have found customers negligent when
they left personalized rubber signature stamps or check-
authenticating devices and blank checks in unlocked desk
drawers that were easily accessible to unauthorized persons.'
Other examples of negligent customer conduct include mailing
the check to the wrong party with the same name as the
payee,205 leaving enough space for a forger to alter the
201. Comment 3 to former § 3-406 states that "[nmo unusual precautions are required,"
and sets forth three examples of conduct that will not preclude the customer from
bringing a claim against the bank for wrongfully paying the customer's check. U.C.C.
§ 3-406cmt. 3(1989);cf U.C.C. § 3-406cmt. 3 (1990)(omitting the statement on unusual
precautions).
202. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990). For the definition of "ordinary care" as applied to
banks, see infra part V.
203.. Both revised and former § 1-103 provide that "the principles of law and equity
... shall supplement" the Code. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990); U.C.C. § 1-103 (1989). The
standard of care in an informal setting may be different from that in a highly commercial
setting. Compare Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 154 (Conn.
1976) (a check was made payable to neighbors who were real estate brokers) with
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Constitution Nat'l Bank, 356 A.2d 117, 124-25 (Conn. 1974)
(a finance company manager had issued checks in a highly commercial setting to persons
based on loan applications that had not been signed). An example of the test for
negligence in a highly commercial setting would be the conduct of a "prudent person
in the position of the finance company's manager." Id.
204. See, e.g., Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 492 P.2d 534, 535 (Wash. 1972)
(stating that the customer's practice of leaving blank checks in an unlocked drawer easily
accessible to an unauthorized employee could amount to negligence); see also U.C.C. § 3-
406 cmt. 7 (1989) (stating that a drawer who makes use of a signature stamp and is
negligent in looking is precluded from asserting bank's breach of contract); cf. Fred
Meyer, Inc. v. Temco Metal Prods. Co., 516 P.2d 80, 83 (Or. 1973) (holding that there
was no negligence where the blank checks were stolen from a locked office in a locked
building).
205. U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 7 (1989).
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numbers or words on a check, 2°  or putting a blank check or
note into the stream of commerce.0 7 While it may not be
negligent for a person to draw a check at the request of an
attorney or agent of the payee if the drawer is unaware that
the person was not authorized to request the check, it may be
negligent to draw a check at the request of other persons
without confirmed authority20 8 or to entrust a check to persons
who do not have even apparent authority.0 9
Both the former and revised Codes require customers to
prevent forgery from occurring, 210 to prevent further occur-
rences of forgery,21  and to discover forgeries and to report
them promptly to the bank.212 But the revised Code imposes
additional specific responsibilities and implies that special
precautions now may be warranted.2 13 Such precautions may
include preventing unauthorized access to checks, preparing
checks properly,214 and assigning check preparation and
account reconciliation to different employees.21 Because of
206. Id. § 3-406 cmt. 3.
207. F.D.I.C. v. Investors Assocs. X, 775 F.2d 152, 154-56 (6th Cir. 1985). An
instrument negligently drawn because it includes blanks does not differ from an
instrument that is completed but so negligently drawn that it can be altered. U.C.C.
§ 3-406 cmt. 1 (1990). But see F.D.I.C. v. Turner, 869 F.2d 270, 273-74 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the fraudulent procurement of the instrument in blank and the criminal
character of the alteration were real defenses that could be asserted against a holder
in due course). The dissent in Turner argued that leaving blank checks accessible
substantially contributed to the alteration because it made the forger's job easier. See
idc. at 276-77 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
208. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 318 N.Y.S.2d 957,
958-59 (App. Term. 1970), affd, 333 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1972).
209. Thompson Maple Prods., Inc. v. Citizens Natl Bank, 234 A.2d 32, 35-36 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1967).
210. U.C.C. § 3406(a) (1990); U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989).
211. U.C.C. §§ 3-404, 3-405 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-405 (1989).
212. U.C.C. § 4-406 (1990); U.C.C. § 4-406 (1989).
213. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-406 (1990); see also id. § 3-405(aX1) (1990) (expanding the
scope of the employer's obligations by defining "employee" to include an independent
contractor). Revised § 3-405 articulates numerous responsibilities of the employer. See
id § 3-405(a)(3). Comment 3 to revised § 3-406 omits the statement that no unusual
precautions are required, formerly in comment 3 to § 3-406. Id § 3-406 cmt. 3; U.C.C.
§ 3-406 cmt. 3 (1989).
214. An instrument that is so negligently drawn that it can be altered is tantamount
to an instrument that includes blanks. The drawer in either case is considered negligent.
U.C.C. § 3-406 cmts. 1 & 3 (1990); U.C.C. § 3-406 (1989).
215. See, e.g., Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 546
NXE.2d 904, 905 (N.Y. 1989). In Putnam Rolling Ladder, the customer was negligent
because it had assigned the duties of preparing its company checks and reconciling its
bank statements to the same person, its bookkeeper. Id The bookkeeper forged 37
checks over a period of 10 months and embezzled nearly $50,000. Id For a similar
holding, see Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d
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the strict liability aspects of revised sections 3-404 and 3-405,
a customer will bear the loss of a forgery committed by an
employee even if the customer exercised reasonable care in
hiring and supervising the employee.216 The customer even
will be responsible for the acts of independent contractors and
their employees.217 It is not clear, however, what additional
special precautions a customer must take to avoid bearing the
loss of forged or altered checks. Moreover, while the common-
law standard of ordinary care will continue to be applied to
customers under revised section 3-406, it is likely that the
additional scope and depth of responsibilities imposed on
customers by other sections of the revised Code will affect the
determination of whether the standard has been met.
Customer conduct that formerly was regarded as within the
exercise of ordinary care may in the future be considered
negligent.218 The customer therefore will have to bear the loss
of the forgery or prove that the bank did not exercise ordinary
care and share the loss with the bank.219
V. THE BANK'S EXERCISE OF ORDINARY CARE
The comparative loss provisions of the revised Code decree
that losses will be shared between the bank and the customer
"according to the extent to which the failure of each to
exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss." 22°  It is
624, 627 (Tenn. 1987) (finding that delegating the duties of preparing checks and
reconciling bank statements to the same person created opportunities for fraud).
216. Sections 3-406 and 4-406 of both the revised and former Codes oblige the drawer
to exercise ordinary care and to detect and report any forgery or alteration promptly.
U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406 (1990); U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406 (1989).
217. Revised § 3-405 states that "'employee'includes an independent contractor and
employee of an independent contractor.' U.C.C. § 3-405(aX1) (1990). The use of the
word "includes" leaves open forjudicial expansion a broader category of persons for whom
a customer may be responsible than those mentioned in the definition.
218. Neither the former Code nor the revised Code defines "negligence." The revised
Code substituted the words "failure to exercise ordinary care" for the word "negligence"
inthe text of § 3-406. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1990). While tort concepts would equate the
terms, application of the new definition of "ordinary care" sets one standard of negligence
for banks and a different standard of negligence for bank customers. See supra notes
153-56 and accompanying text.
219. U.C.C. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), 4-406(e) (1990).
220. Id. § 3-406(b); see id. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b). Revised § 4-406(e) also adopts a
comparative negligence standard, allocating the loss between the customer and the bank
"according to the extent to which the failure of the customer to comply with subsection
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.essential, therefore, to examine more closely the meaning of
"ordinary care" as defined in section 3-103(a)(7) of the revised
Code:
"Ordinary care" in the case of a person engaged in
business means observance of reasonable commercial
standards, prevailing in the area in which the person is
located, with respect to the business in which the person
is engaged. In the case of a bank that takes an instru-
ment for processing for collection or payment by
automated means, reasonable commercial standards do
not require the bank to examine the instrument if the
failure to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed
procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary
unreasonably from general banking usage not disapproved
by this Article or Article 4.22'
The most significant impact of the revised Code's introduc-
tion of a definition for "ordinary care" is the specific exclusion
of sight-review procedures. This exclusion is important
because, under the former Code, litigation over forged or
altered checks frequently considered the bank's failure to sight
review checks as evidence of negligence. Thus, the revised
Code effectively will prevent consumer suits against banks for
losses suffered from forged or altered checks because there can
be no realistic expectation of finding the bank negligent for
failing to detect the forgery or alteration.' Most banks
already have discontinued sight examination of small dollar
amount checks and, under the former Code, absorb the occa-
sional loss due to forgery. The revisions effectively will
eliminate even this exposure to liability.
A. Limited Sight Review and Ordinary Care
Banks that have decided that the costs of examination far
exceed any anticipated loss the bank might suffer in having
[4-406](c) and the failure of the bank to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss."
Id. § 4-406(e).
221. Id. § 3-103(a)(7).
222. This is especially troublesome considering that customers already frequently
absorb the loss of wrongful payment because it is not cost effective to litigate against
the bank. Hull, supra note 61, at 612 & n.62.
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to pay small checks if forgery is established already have
limited the sight review of small dollar amount checks. 223 This
practice of limited sight review' has mushroomed, in part,
because of the sheer volume of checks that must be processed
each year.22' Most banks in the nation, therefore, no longer
routinely examine checks below a specified face amount.2
Instead, banks review only a small percentage of randomly
selected checks below the specified dollar amount. The rest
of the small dollar amount checks are not examined unless the
bank has reason to suspect a problem with the check.
227
Failing to. sight review all checks predictably resulted in
losses and litigation. Under the former Code, courts were
divided on whether the bank practice of limited sight review
satisfied the bank's duty to exercise ordinary care with respect
to the payment of checks. Some courts held that ordinary care
necessarily implies that every check must be scrutinized
individually. Other courts held the bank strictly liable
223. See, e.g., Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank, 552 N.E.2d 783,
785 (111. 1990) (stating that the bank in question set its sight-review threshold at $1000);
Florence P. Berkley, Computerized Check Processing and a Bank's Duty to Use Ordinary
Care, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1173,1199 n.183 (1987); see also Fairfax Leary, Jr., Check Handling
Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 331, 334 (1965)
(supporting arguments for savings and efficiency as grounds for interpreting Code rules).
224. The sight-review procedures of the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company's
bookkeeping division that were in effect in the early 1980s typify these practices. A clerk
compared each check that came into the bookkeeping center against the signature card
on file. During a four-hour shift, the clerk reviewed approximately 4200 checks, spending
at most four seconds to inspect each check. See Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co., 546 N.E.2d 904, 905 (N.Y. 1989).
225. See supra note 17. In 1983, 76.14% of all checks were in amounts less than
$128, which represented only 5.25% of the value of all checks. George C. White, The
Conflicting Roles of the Fed as a Regulator and a Competitor, 14 J. BANK RES. (1983).
Many metropolitan banks ceased manual verification of signatures because of the
pressure to process a high volume of checks prior to the midnight deadline. See, e.g.,
Five Towns College v. Citibank N.A., 489 N.Y.S.2d 338, 340-41 (App. Div. 1985).
226. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st
Cir. 1988) (stating that the amount beneath which most banks do not examine signatures
on all checks is $2500 or more). Already by the early 1980s, most banks in Chicago used
an automatic check-sorting device to process large volumes of checks rapidly. The
machine separates checks in amounts below a threshold amount and pays them
automatically. Wilder 11, 552 N.E.2d at 785; see also Five Towns College, 489 N.Y.S.2d
at 341 (discussing safeguards in addition to sight review). Banking industry experts
recommend limited sight review. Rhode Island Hosp., 848 F.2d at 294.
227. The bank has reason to know that the check is not valid if the customer warned
the bank of a possible forgery or if the check was drawn on an account with insufficient
funds. Rhode Island Hosp., 848 F.2d at 294.
228. Frankini v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 88 P.2d 790, 793 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1939) (holding that the teller has a duty to acquaint himself with the signature
of the depositor). More recent cases involving unreasonable practices include Hanover
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pursuant to the bank's contract with the drawer even if the
forgeries were so well done that they would not have been
detected by individual sight examination. 2  Still other courts
held that "[a]n industry-wide practice that saves money
without significantly increasing the number of forged checks
that the banks erroneously pay is a practice that reflects at
least 'ordinary care.' ' 230 The First Circuit, in Rhode Island
Hospital Trust National Bank v. Zapata Corp.," suggested
that, even if less sight review resulted in some increase in the
number of undetected forgeries, the customer must prove that
the increased loss would be unreasonably excessive compared
to the savings in costs in order to establish the bank's
negligence. 
2
B. The Interplay Between Check Truncation
and Ordinary Care
Decoupling sight-review obligations from the exercise of
ordinary care promotes bank acceptance of check truncation
without fear of liability. It therefore is not surprising that the
definition of "ordinary care" in the revised Code releases
banks from the obligation to sight review and at the same
Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501,505 (D. Kan. 1979) (holding that
failure to examine any checks whatsoever constituted a lack of ordinary care); Perley
v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 155 (Conn. 1976) (stating that the bank
failed to demonstrate that its practice of not authenticating checks of any dollar amount
was reasonable); Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. FACO, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 202,205 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (stating that the trier of fact found that the bank lacked ordinary care because
checks without signatures were paid and 30 check copies were lost); Medford Irrigation
Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329, 332-33 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that failure
to examine all checks under $5000 constituted a lack of ordinary care).
229. Medford Irrigation Dist., 676 P.2d at 333.
230. Rhode Island Hosp., 848 F.2d at 295; cf. Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624, 628-29 (Tenn. 1987) (weighing economic
feasibility and business practice into the definition of ordinary care and reasonable
commercial standards).
231. 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988).
232. The bank's exercise of ordinary care was a "matter of costs of prevention com-
pared with correlative risks of loss." Rhode Island Hosp., 848 F.2d at 295; see also
Vending Chattanooga, 730 S.W.2d at 628, 629; cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (defining "duty" by calculating the probability of injury
times the gravity of harm to determine the "burden of precaution" that is warranted).
By asserting that the bank exercised no care with respect to the checks it failed to
examine, the RhodeIslandHospital Court simply assumed that the selective examination
system was unreasonable and did not prove that the bank did not exercise care.
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time omits any reference to balancing the costs of sight review
against the benefits of detecting the forgery of large dollar
items.m If the anticipated substantial savings from check
truncation are weighed against the small losses anticipated
from not detecting forged or altered checks, the decision to
eliminate sight review and to embrace check truncation is
commercially reasonable.'
C. Reasonable Commercial Standards
and Ordinary Care
The revisions to the Code explicitly equate the exercise of
ordinary care with the observance of reasonable commercial
standards.' This resolves the judicial debate over the
interpretation of "reasonable care," "reasonable banking stan-
dards," "reasonable commercial standards," and "ordinary
care " ' in terms of general banking practice rather than in
terms of a bank's duty to its customer. It is understandable
how the linguistic confusion may arise. The word "reasonable"
in "reasonable commercial standards" implies that the
commercial practice is not by itself negligent or lacking in
233. If a paper-based system were retained, it very well could be cost effective to
continue sight-review procedures for large dollar amount checks, because, under the
former Code, the losses for wrongful payment could be substantial. But in anticipation
of the electronic presentment system and check truncation, eliminating the sight-review
procedure will reduce costs and make check truncation possible.
234. The U.C.C's decision to allow banks to eliminate sight review apparently consid-
ered not only sight-review costs but also those costs associated with processing paper
checks regardless of the issue of fraud, forgery, or sight review, because no limitation
on dollar value of checks was imposed or suggested.
235. "Ordinary care" previously was not defined in Article Three. Instead, conduct
was guided by the Article One definition of "good faith," which meant "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989). Proving that a bank
was negligent in not sufficiently instructing its staff to discover forgeries is not enough
to establish bad faith. Retail Shoe Health Comm'n v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
558 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951-52 (App. Div. 1990). Revised § 3-103(a)(4) imported the merchant
standard of "good faith," which is "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 3-103(aX4) (1990). The Official
Comments state that "fair dealing" and "ordinary care" must be judged in light of rea-
sonable commercial standards, but they also state that "ordinary care means observance
of reasonable commercial standards." See id. § 3-103 cmts. 4-5.
236. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 558 P.2d 328,
333-34 (Or. 1976).
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ordinary care.2 7 Rather, one would expect a bank, and banks
in the aggregate, to conduct business in an economic and
efficient manner; in other words, one would expect banks to
operate in a commercially reasonable fashion.
But a choice that may be "commercially reasonable" for a
bank in the conduct of its own business is not necessarily the
same choice that would satisfy the obligation to exercise
"ordinary care" in fulfilling its duties to its customers.
"Reasonable care,"238 or "ordinary care" in the traditional
understanding of the term, is not necessarily the same as
"commercially reasonable" or "reasonable commercial
standards." Some courts facing these issues have recognized
these distinctions.
In Medford Irrigation District v. Western Bank,239 an Oregon
court faced the question of whether a commercially reasonable
practice constituted ordinary care. The depositor's bookkeeper
had forged several checks which the bank then automatically
paid through its computerized check-cashing system. The
depositor sought to impose liability on the bank for the losses
suffered, asserting that the bank had failed to exercise
ordinary care in determining whether the signatures on the
checks were authorized. 240 Under Western Bank's computer-
ized check-payment system, all checks with a face amount
under $5000 automatically were paid without human
intervention or sight review of the signatures.2 1
Western Bank argued in its defense that it was commer-
cially reasonable to abandon sight review because the
$200,000 annual cost of reviewing checks for signatures far
exceeded the losses due to the small number of forgeries that
it would detect by individually reviewing the checks. Western
Bank contended, moreover, that it had exercised ordinary care
237. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 293 (1st
Cir. 1988).
238. The "reasonable care" of § 3-406 may be defined as the care of an "ordinarily
prudent person under the circumstances." Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368
A.2d 149, 153 (Conn. 1976).
239. 676 P.2d 329 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
240. Id. at 331. The depositor conceded that he was negligent in not supervising
the bookkeeper, in not auditing the accounts, and in not reviewing the bank statements,
and that such negligence substantially contributed to the forgeries. Id. Nevertheless,
the depositor claimed that his own negligence did not preclude him from asserting the
unauthorized payment by the bank because the bank also was negligent. Id.; see U.C.C.
§ 3-406 (1989).
241. Medford, 676 P.2d at 331. Checks under $5000 were reviewed ifa "hold" or 'stop
payment" order had been received by the bank, but not otherwise. Id.
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because its procedures conformed to methods used by most
banks of its size throughout the United States, and the
banking practice was commercially reasonable.'
The Medford court rejected the bank's attempt to equate
commercially reasonable conduct with the exercise of ordinary
care. Instead, the court stated that the bank owed a duty to
its customers under the U.C.C. to use ordinary care to debit
the customer's account only upon the customer's proper
authorization. Therefore, whatever procedure the bank used
to process checks and to review signatures must "reasonably
relate to the detection of unauthorized signatures in order to
be considered an exercise of ordinary care or reasonable
commercial banking standards."243 The Medford court held
the bank negligent as a matter of law. 2 4
As in Medford, the court in Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park
Trust & Savings Bank"5 held that the bank's system of auto-
matically paying all checks below a threshold amount without
any sight review "completely ignore[d] the customer's signa-
ture as a criterion for accepting drafts" and demonstrated a
lack of ordinary care as a matter of law.2 6 According to
Wilder, even if the automatic check-cashing procedures are
used by all banks, they do not satisfy the bank's duty under
the Code to exercise ordinary care." 7 The bank, therefore, was
"foreclosed" from asserting the depositor's negligence and was
liable for paying the face amount of the forged checks.2'
242. Id. at 332.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 334.
245. 527 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 552 N.E.2d 783 (Ill.
1990). For a discussion of the Illinois Supreme Court decision reversing Wilder Binding
Co., see infra notes 262-268 and accompanying text. For purposes of clarity, the Illinois
Supreme Court opinion will be referred to as Wilder H.
246. 527 N.E.2d at 358. Because the bank had the duty to know 'the genuineness
of the depositores signature" and "an absolute duty not to pay unauthorized drafts, such
payment, even in good faith, violates the duty to pay only those items which are 'properly
payable.'" Id. (citations omitted).
247. Id.; accord Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 155 (Conn.
1976) (stating that even if a procedure is common among banks, the banks must show
that such conduct is reasonable); Medford, 676 P.2d at 332 (stating that a procedure com-
mon throughout the banking industry is not reasonable by virtue of that fact alone; the
bank's procedure must be reasonably related to the detection of unauthorized signatures).
Contra Wilder H, 552 N.E.2d at 787 (indicating that a practice consistent with general
banking usage is prima facie the exercise of ordinary care); Vending Chattanooga, Inc.
v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that
a bank that pays a check in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards exercises ordinary care).
248. Wilder Binding Co., 527 N.E.2d at 358.
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Wilder Binding Co. adopted, as a cornerstone of ordinary
care, Medford's requirement that a check-processing procedure
must bear a reasonable relationship to detecting improper
signatures and rejected the concept that general banking
usage "magically insulate[s] banks from the duty of ordinary
care." 249 That most banks used similar automatic check-
cashing procedures was "immaterial if the procedure itself
fails to comport with the bank's statutory duties to the
customer."'
Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American National Bank &
Trust Co."5 broke from this tradition and held that "a bank
exercises ordinary care when it pays a check in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of
the banking industry."1 2 Rather than a "reasonable relation-
ship to detection of forgery" test to determine whether the
bank exercised ordinary care, the Vending Chattanooga court
took into account the "general banking usage" with respect
to check processing.' While broader than a practice of a
mere two or three banks, "general banking usage" is not
necessarily broader than usage followed generally throughout
a metropolitan area.' According to the Vending Chattanooga
court, the facts of a particular case and the reasonable
commercial standard of the banking industry would determine
whether a bank exercised ordinary care. 2ms
Thus, Vending Chattanooga rejected the traditional view
that a bank must examine closely the signature on each check
with the signature card because "[t]o follow such a rule would
place the bank in an impossible situation."2 6 Either the banks
would be insurers of all forgeries regardless of the customer's
lack of reasonable care, or the banks would be obliged to hire
249. Id; see also Medford, 676 P.2d at 332 (stating that although a procedure may
be common throughout the banking industry, it is not by that fact alone a reasonable
procedure).
250. Wilder Binding Co., 527 N.E.2d at 358.
251. 730 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. 1987).
252. Id, at 628.
253. Id- at 629. Both the revised and former Codes state that "action or non-action
consistent with ... a general banking usage" prima facie constitutes "the exercise of
ordinary care." U.C.C. § 4-103(c) (1990); U.C.C. § 4-103(3) (1989).
254. Vending Chattanooga, 730 S.W.2d at 629 (stating that general banking usage
"should be taken to mean a general usage common to banks in the area concerned").
255. Icd at 628.
256. Id. Vending Chattanooga expressly overruled the holding in Jackson v. First
Nat'l Bank, 403 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966), on the grounds that it in effect re-
quired the bank employees to be handwriting experts. 730 S.W.2d at 628.
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such a large number of skilled handwriting experts that it
would be "economically not feasible, and certainly not
commercially reasonable." 27 The Vending Chattanooga court
considered such a result to be incompatible with the intent
of the Code.' The revised Code obviously shares this opinion.
D. Ordinary Care as a Question of Law or Fact
Courts also have disagreed on whether commercial reason-
ableness and the exercise of ordinary care is a question of law
or of fact. 9 Medford held that the bank was negligent as a
matter of law because it failed to have any sight-review
procedures for checks under the face amount of $5000.m
Wilder observed that "[d]epending on the circumstances the
question of ordinary care may be a question of fact or law. " "
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed this straddling
approach in Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings
Bank262 (Wilder II) and held that "whether a bank exercised
ordinary care in paying a check presents a genuine issue of
material fact" and that it is not up to the court but up to the
fact finder to weigh the competing concerns.' The dissent
in Wilder Binding Co., whose view was adopted by the
257. Vending Chattanooga, 730 S.W.2d at 628.
258. Id. at 628-29.
259. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. Compare American Mach. Tool
Distribs. Ass'n v. National Permanent Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 464 A.2d 907, 913-15
(D.C. 1983) (holding that it is commercially unreasonable as a matter of law for a bank
to take for deposit in an individual account a check made payable to a corporation
without first confirming the signatures) with Kuwait Airways Corp. v. American Sec.
Bank, 890 F.2d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that commercial reasonableness is
a question of fact for the jury). Whether the customer's negligence facilitates the forgery
under U.C.C. § 3-406 or whether the customer fails to comply with the duties to inspect
irregularities promptly under U.C.C. § 4-406 presents material questions of fact which
cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
No. 80 C 4311 (N.D. Ill. April 30, 1981).
260. Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329,333 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
261. Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 527 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 552 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 1990).
262. 552 N.E.2d 783 (III. 1990).
263. Id at 786. The dissent in Wilder H vigorously argued that there was no
question of material fact as to whether the bank exercised ordinary care. The dissent
argued that "[a]utomatic preclusion from review of 93% of all checks processed based
solely on the amount of the check" constituted a lack of ordinary care as a matter of law.
Id. at 789 (Calvo, J., dissenting).
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majority in Wilder II, 2" addressed the question of "ordinary
care" as a question of fact under section 4-103(3).265 The issue
of whether the bank's "action or non-action [was] consistent.
with .. general banking usage" reflected the intent of the
drafters "to provide for flexibility in determining what
constitutes ordinary care" and necessitated a factual deter-
mination of whether the bank paid the check in good faith and
in accordance with "the reasonable commercial standards of
the banking industry." 6
Whereas Medford found a bank negligent as a matter of law,
Wilder Binding Co. treated the issue as a matter of law or
fact, depending upon the circumstances. Wilder II and
Vending Chattanooga, in contrast, treated the ordinary care
issue as a question of fact.267 Yet all of these courts recognized
the bank's absolute duty to pay only authorized drafts.
Given the bank's duty to pay only on the customers
authorization, liability hinged on the location of the burden
of proving the bank's exercise, or failure to exercise, ordinary
care. Because the bank's lack of ordinary care was resolved
as a question of law in Wilder Binding Co., the customer was
not called upon to meet this burden and therefore was
successful in its action against the bank. The burden shifting
was significant in Wilder II and in Vending Chattanooga,
however, where the issue of lack of ordinary care was a
question of fact. Vending Chattanooga placed the burden of
proving the bank's lack of ordinary care on the customer. 2
The customer in Vending Chattanooga failed to establish that
the bank was negligent and consequently was unable to
recover from the bank for the losses sustained by the bank's
payment of the forged checks.269 The revised Code would
reach a similar result because customers will be unable to
meet this burden.27' Due to the permissible elimination of
264. Id. at 786.
265. See id. at 789-90 (Calvo, J., dissenting). Because the former Code did not define
ordinary care," this issue frequently was resolved in terms of former § 4-103(3).
266. Wilder Binding Co., 527 N.E.2d at 360 (Jiganti, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). The dissent also linked the question of ordinary care to U.C.C. § 4-103(3)
because comment 4 thereto refers to the general usage common to banks in the area
concerned. See id.
267. See Vending Chattanooga, 730 S.W.2d at 628; supra notes 262-65 and
accompanying text.
268. Vending Chattanooga, 730 S.W.2d at 629.
269. Id. at 629-30 (holding that the depositor's negligence in failing to discover and
report the forgeries was a proximate cause of the bank's payment of the forged checks).
270. See U.C.C. § 4-406(d), (e) (1990).
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sight-review procedures, the revisions effectively will preclude
a discussion of whether a bank meets the standard of ordinary
care either as a matter of fact or of law.1
71
E. General Banking Usage and Ordinary Care
The revised Code establishes the bank's standard of care for
the sight review of checks by reference to the general practice
of the banking industry. The definition of ordinary care
authorizes banks that use automated procedures to discontin-
ue the traditional practice of sight review by which forged or
altered checks are detected. 272 Authorizing banks to eliminate
sight-review procedures altogether, of course, resolves the
judicial debate over whether limited sight review is sufficient
to establish the bank's exercise of ordinary care.
The new standard, however, countermands the traditional
judicial view concerning the weight that banking practice
should be afforded in evaluating the bank's exercise of ordinary
care. Courts deciding cases under the former Code held that
even if a bank proves its conformity with local practice, the
bank is "not automatically exonerated" from exercising ordinary
care. 3 Rather, the formulation of a standard for reasonable
or ordinary care could include, but was not defined by, banking
practice. 274 The customer could show that the entire industry's
practice reflected a lack of ordinary care and therefore was
unreasonable for an individual bank to adopt.275
271. See U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 4 (1990); U.C.C. § 1-103(aX7) (1989).
272. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).
273. Hanover Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 506 (D. Kan.
1979). Quoting from the plaintiffs brief, the court noted that "no matter what minimal
standards are suggested by local banking usage [such usage] cannot amend the
statutory requirement of ordinary care." Id. at 506. Quoting from Prosser's The Law
of Torts, the court continued, "Even an entire industry, by adopting such careless
methods to save time, effort or money, cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled
standard." Id
Section 3-103 of the revised Code explicitly "rejects those authorities that hold, in
effect, that failure to use sight examination is negligence as a matter of law." U.C.C.
§ 4-406 cmt. 4 (1990). The comment does not preclude a challenge to the absence of
sight review explicitly, but the emphatic language in the statutory provision to which
the comment refers precludes any realistic chance of success if such a challenge is
launched. See id.
274. Coleman v. Brotherhood State Bank, 592 P.2d 103, 109 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
275. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st
Cir. 1988) (relying on Judge Learned Hand's opinion in New England Coal & Coke Co.
v. Northern Barge Corp. (The T.J. Hooper), 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 289 U.S. 662 (1932).
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For example, the trial court in Putnam Rolling Ladder Co.
v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 276 held that a bank was
negligent because its sight-review procedures were ineffective
to discover forgeries and because the bank had paid checks
with missing signatures. 2' The Appellate Division disagreed
and held that the bank's negligence must be determined not
by the reasonableness of the bank's own review procedures,
but by whether the bank's procedures were consistent with
clearinghouse rules or general banking usage.278 In so holding,
the Appellate Division equated banking practice with the
exercise of ordinary care. Under this analysis, testimony
describing banking practices could make out a prima facie case
of "ordinary care" under former section 4-103(3).279
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision
on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to overcome the
presumption that the bank had exercised ordinary care and
consequently failed to meet its burden of proof.2 ° The New
York Court of Appeals rejected the views of both the trial court
and the Appellate Division and held that the plaintiff is not
required to disprove the "safe harbor" features of section 4-
103(3). 2 l Instead, the plaintiff needs only to establish the
bank's failure to exercise "ordinary care" in its normal tort
meaning. 2  That is, a plaintiff can "prove a bank lacked
276. 546 N.E.2d 904 (N.Y. 1989).
277. Id. at 905.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 907; see also Rhode Island Hosp., 848 F.2d at 294-95 ("An industry-wide
practice that saves money without significantly increasing the number of forged checks
that the banks erroneously pay is a practice that reflects at least'ordinary care.' "). Section
4-103 now provides:
Action or non-action approved by this Article or pursuant to Federal Reserve
regulations or operating circulars is the exercise of ordinary care and, in the absence
of special instructions, action or non-action consistent with clearing-house rules
and the like or with a general banking usage not disapproved by this Article, is
prima facie the exercise of ordinary care.
U.C.C. § 4-103(c) (1990).
280. Putnam Rolling Ladder, 546 N.E.2d at 905.
281. Id. at 907-08. Apparently, the bank is "safe" from allegations of negligence if
it acts pursuant to federal regulations and bank operating circulars or if it does what
other banks normally do. The court in Putnam Rolling Ladder put the burden on the
bank to prove that it came within the safe harbor. Id. at 907. The safe-harbor provision
mitigates the harshness of imposing the entire loss on the bank when both the bank
and its customer have been negligent, especially when the customer is by far the more
negligent party. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 62, at 240 n.62.
282. Putnam Rolling Ladder, 546 N.E.2d at 906.
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ordinary care by presenting any type of proof that the bank
failed to act reasonably."283 Ultimately, under the former Code,
the customer successfully could prove the bank's negligence
by challenging the bank's failure to examine the checks as a
breach of the bank's duty to exercise ordinary care. 2'1 But with
the revisions enacted, customers no longer will be able to
challenge the bank's lack of ordinary care with respect to the
absence of sight-review procedures.2m Whether courts
discussed ordinary care in terms of the bank's duty to the
customer's account,' by the commercial reasonableness of the
conduct, 7 or by reference to general banking practice, 2M one
principle was clear under the former Code: conformity to
general banking practice did not conclusively establish the
exercise of ordinary care.
VI. TRANSFORMATION FROM THE PAPER
AGE TO THE ELECTRONIC ERA
Electronic check presentment and truncation ultimately will
benefit both the banking industry and consumers of banking
services. The costs of manufacturing, transporting, mailing,
and storing paper are extremely high and probably will
continue to soar. At best they are fixed costs that cannot be
reduced. Physical limitations also present time constraints:
paper can be moved only so fast in the best of worlds. Under
the former Code, banks recognized these limitations by
adopting limited sight-review procedures.m Banks consciously
breached their agreements with customers and absorbed, as
part of their cost of doing business, the expense of occasional
forgeries that passed through the banking system.' Under
283. Id.
284. Id, at 906-07.
285. This is due principally to the explicit reference to the absence of sight review
in revised § 3-103(a)(7) and to the check truncation features of new § 4-110 and revised
§ 4-406. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(7), 4-406,4-110(1990). The former Code, however, remains
the law in most states. See supra notes 1-2.
286. Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329,332 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
287. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 296 (1st
Cir. 1988).
288. Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American Natl Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d
624, 628 (Tenn. 1987).
289. See supra notes 223-227 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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these circumstances, letting the loss remain with the bank was
"neither unforeseen nor unfair." 1 It simply was a cost of doing
business. 2 The costs of transformation from the paper age
to the electronic era, however, should not necessitate blanket
protection for banks against a newly qualified class of negligent
persons.
A. Who Should Bear the Losses?
The revised Code, for all practical purposes, passes on these
costs of doing business to negligent customers. Banks that
under the former Code would have been considered negligent
no longer will be negligent under the revised Code. The
rationale for the revisions, that an electronic system will be
faster and more efficient than a paper-based system, considers
the banking system as a whole, not the costs and benefits
realized by any individual customer.23 Likewise, a bank's
decision to abandon sight review for some categories of checks
is based on an evaluation of the overall cost to the bank of
bearing the losses for wrongful payment compared to the
overall benefit of processing checks more rapidly." Under
291. Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 527 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 552 N.E.2d 783 (II. 1990).
292. Even if the customer were negligent, it would be "improper" for a bank to refuse
to inspect the checks and then nevertheless to pass through to the customer the cost
of any forged items that got through the check-processing system. Id. at 358-59.
293. See, e.g.,U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 1 (1990) (explaining that requiringless information
on the statements that banks provide to customers results in "less cost to the check collec-
tion system and, thus, to all customers of the system").
294. The decision to implement limited sight-review procedures under the former
Code was in part based on the assumption that relatively few forgeries occurred. The
occurrence of a greater number of forgery cases would tend to lead, under the former
Code, to the bank's decision to restore sight-review procedures or their equivalent. The
revised Code's elimination of all sight-review procedures will destroy any deterrent
function that sight review served and therefore will increase the frequency of future
forgeries. Deterrence is difficult to measure. It cannot be mere coincidence, however,
that forgers draw checks for dollar amounts just below the threshold sight-review amounts.
See, e.g., Wilder H, 552 N.E.2d at 784 (forger forged $25,000'worth of checks, each for
less than $1000, the threshold sight-review amount). The losses to consumers should
be expected to increase as the deterrent function of a sight-examination procedure will
disappear with the demise of the procedure. Moreover, as the paper-based system converts
to electronic transmission of data in a system of check truncation, the opportunities
presented for fraud will furtherincrease losses to the consumer. See, e.g., Carreker, supra
note 93, at 18. It will be difficult for customers to deter or to detect electronic or computer-
literate fraud.
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this cost-benefit analysis, in effect under the former Code, the
bank bears the loss, an anticipated consequence of its decision.
The cost-benefit test works if the bank is willing to absorb
the loss, but it malfunctions if the loss is transferred to an
individual customer, because the decision is not related to the
effects on the individual customer who will bear the loss if the
check is paid wrongfully. For example, an occasional loss of
$4999 compared to benefits in the millions would reasonably
justify, from the bank's perspective, the elimination of sight
review for checks under $5000. This cost-benefit analysis
reflects a commercially reasonable decision under the former
Code, where the bank bears the occasional loss. But under
the revised Code the bank would not pay the loss-the
consumer would. This cost-benefit test therefore is inapposite
under the revised Code because the costs and benefits are not
compared for the same entity. The costs to an individual are
instead weighed against the benefits to a whole system. The
revised Code implicitly recognizes this inapplicability because
it permits a bank, or a group of banks, to decide that the
benefits enjoyed by the system as a whole justify the elimina-
tion of sight review without any consideration of the losses
to be sustained. But should there be no cost-benefit analysis
for individual consumers, whose entire life savings could be
destroyed by a $4999 loss? Surely the relatively small cost
of reviewing that check, if weighed by the individual in a cost-
benefit analysis, is preferable to suffering the loss.
The losses incurred under a system that is adopted in order
to benefit the aggregate population should be distributed
among all users and providers.295 The loss, which in the larger
scheme may be inconsequential, should not be transferred to
individual users, to whom such a loss could be personally
catastrophic. Using the example above, a $4999 loss may be
minimal from an overall bank perspective, but it could
represent a tremendous loss to a consumer with limited
financial resources. Therefore, the costs incurred as a result
of the adoption of technological advancements should not fall
on individual victims, but should be distributed among all
recipients of those benefits. This is so, not only because of the
inherent fairness of such a policy decision, but also because
symmetric application of the cost-benefit analysis demands
that result.
295. The cost of transformation to such a system also should be shared.
180
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One may point out that the "victims" who will suffer the loss
are persons who themselves have been negligent and therefore
"deserve" to bear the consequences. That it is the negligent
customer who will bear the additional loss sustained from
larger checks being paid without review does not change this
analysis. A customer who is negligent, through inadvertence
or carelessness, is not likely to be less negligent simply because
the penalty is larger. 6 While the comparative negligence
provisions theoretically would distribute the loss between the
negligent bank and its negligent customer, the synergistic
operation of the new provisions 297 almost certainly will cause
the loss resulting from the unauthorized payment of a forged
or altered check to fall on the individual "negligent" customer
and not on the "negligent" bank, despite the adoption of the
comparative loss provisions in the revised Code.
B. Departures from Traditional Doctrine
The revised Code departs from the traditional tort principles
that permit review of the custom of the industry. 298 The
customer no longer will have an opportunity to challenge
whether the bank has exercised ordinary care, as that term
conventionally is understood.299 Instead, the customer must
296. A customer should not be insulated from its own gross negligence, however, where
the customer paid no attention to the potential for loss. See generally Edward Rubin,
Efficiency, Equity and the ProposedRevisionof Articles 3and 4,42 AIA. L. REV. 551 (1991)
(discussing issues ofsocialequity and concluding that the revisions perpetuate inefficiency
and inequity and should not be enacted by the state legislatures).
297. The new provisions, as previously discussed, introduce comparative negligence,
see supra part IV.A-B, authorize the complete elimination of sight review, see supra notes
220-222 and accompanying text, ratify electronic presentment and check truncation,
see supra part V.B, and increase the scope and degree of the customer's responsibilities,
see supra part I.C.
298. According to Prosser and Keeton, an "arbitrary rule" in which the ordinary usage
of a business or industry becomes the sole criterion as to what a reasonable person should
have done "prove[s] inthe long run impossible to justify .... [Clustoms which are entirely
reasonable under the ordinary circumstances which give rise to them in the first instance
may become entirely unreasonable in the light of a single fact altering the situation in
the particular case." KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 33, at 194.
299. According to Prosser and Keeton, 'Even an entire industry, by adopting such
careless methods to save time, effort or money, cannot be permitted to set its own
uncontrolled standard." Id.; accord New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Northern Barge
Corp. (The T.J. Hooper), 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) (holding that the lack
of industry practice requiring radios on ocean-going barges does not preclude liability
for damage caused by the lack of a radio), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Transp. Co. v.
Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
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prove what the banking practice is and that the bank failed
to conform to that practice. 30° Plaintiffs who are not familiar
with the customs of the banking industry already face a
staggering burden of proof.30 1 The customer's burden of proving
bank negligence will be even greater because the revised Code
protects banking practice with respect to the sight review of
checks. °2
Customers, moreover, will not be treated equally with banks
because the standard of ordinary care is different for customers
than for banks.3 Whereas a bank will be able to successfully
assert conformity to general banking practice to establish
nonnegligence, 3°4 it is unlikely that a customer will be able to
successfully defend against a claim of negligence by showing
that the customer's actions conformed to customary consumer
behavior."°  Instead, the customer's negligence will be
measured by the duty of the customer to the bank and by that
customer's exercise of ordinary care in acquittal of that duty.
3 °6
Thus, customers will be held to a standard of care different
from that to be applied to banks.
Establishing banking practice as the standard of ordinary
care further departs from traditional tort principles because
it transforms the bank's duty from one owed to its individual
customers to one owed to customers in the aggregate-in other
words, to a duty owed by the bank to itself. Reducing overall
bank costs may be in accordance with a bank's duties as a
profit-making institution to itself, to its shareholders, and even
to its customers in general, and in that sense may be
commercially reasonable. Such cost reduction, nonetheless,
may disadvantage a particular customer. To state that a bank
which acted in a commercially reasonable manner therefore
exercised ordinary care in fulfilling its obligation to its
300. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 293 (1st
Cir. 1988).
301. Where the special knowledge or ability of the defendant is involved, as in the
case of banks, the customer effectively may be deprived of any remedy in the absence
of expert testimony to support the customer's assertion of the bank's negligence. See
generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 32, at 185-88.
302. See supra part V.
303. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990) (defining 'ordinary care" for banks and for "a
person engaged in business," but offering no definition for others).
304. Id- § 4-103(c).
305. While the general practice among customers may be to leave their checkbooks
in unlocked drawers or on top of desks, the relevant test of ordinary care for customers
is not whether the customer behaves the way most other customers do, but whether that
customer satisfied its duty to the bank to exercise ordinary care. See id, § 4-406.
306. See id
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customer is equivalent to concluding that a manufacturer who
reduced costs of production therefore exercised due care even
though its product injured a particular plaintiff. Cost reduction
and ordinary care are not synonymous. Rather, equating ordi-
nary care with reasonable commercial standards confuses duty
with economy.
That a bank may have acted in a commercially reasonable
manner does not satisfy the bank's contractual obligation to
the customer.3"7 The decision to breach may be commercially
reasonable, 308 but under contract theory, the person who causes
a breach, even if it is an efficient breach, is liable for the
damages arising from that breach.3" To the extent that, under
the revised Code, banking practice will relieve a bank from
the consequences of failing to honor its agreement with the
customer to pay only authorized checks, it contradicts
fundamental expectations and undermines the contractual
relationship between the bank and its customer. Moreover,
imposing a standard of care unrelated to the contract or to the
usual evaluation of tort duty310 effectively eliminates the
customer's remedy for the bank's breach of contract. To allow
a bank to negate its contractual obligation to pay only
authorized checks and then to shift the loss to the customer
for that failure is equivalent to breaching a contract and then
making the nonbreaching party pay for the damages.3
307. Formerly, the absence of any sight-review procedures, rather than the
ineffectiveness of the existing procedures with respect to detecting the forgery on a
particular check, occasioned greater judicial concern. As one judge stated, "[E]very check
crossing defendant's threshold should be subject to some probability of examination."
Wilder II, 552 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ill. 1990) (Calvo, J., dissenting).
308. These decisions resulted in substantial savings to the banks. See, e.g., Carreker,
supra note 93, at 19; see also Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848
F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that implementing the practice of limited sight
review saved the bank about $125,000 annually).
309. For more on the doctrine of efficient breach, see supra notes 111, 152.
310. For the bank to absolve itself from any obligation because the customer may
have been negligent is, by analogy to tort law, equivalent to abrogating the theory of
the last clear chance of the defendant to avoidharm. Even a negligent plaintiff is entitled
to the protection of a defendant who is in a position to avoid harm by taking preventive
action. The classic expression of this doctrine is found in Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep.
588 (Ex. 1842). Of course, the introduction of comparative negligence principles has eroded
this doctrine. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). By analogy,
the bank has the last opportunity before paying the check to determine that payment
conforms to the customer's order.
311. See, e.g., Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329 (Or. Ct. App.
1984); see also Wilder 11, 552 N.E.2d at 789 (Calvo, J., dissenting) (contending that the
defendant bank "cannot abdicate its duty of ordinary care under section 4-406(3) to
plaintiff" by 'relying on its customers' duty of review to fulfill its own duty of ordinary
care"). Perhaps the contract between the bank and the customer should include an explicit
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Furthermore, the bank's failure to sight review will not
necessarily reflect an economically efficient result under the
revised Code. By establishing the practice of no sight review
as per se nonnegligent bank behavior, without any requirement
to balance costs and benefits even with respect to large dollar
checks, and without any substitute procedures for detection
of electronically induced forgery, the revisions remove the
banking industry's incentive to consider cost effectiveness with
respect to the detection of forged or altered checks.312 Ifa bank
routinely pays checks in accordance with established banking
practice, the bank will have exercised ordinary care even if
the checks were for large dollar amounts and even if none of
the checks were examined. Arguably, under the new system
it could even be commercially unreasonable for a bank to
examine any checks, and legally unnecessary to develop
alternative detection procedures, because there would be no
losses incurred by the bank for failure to sight review but there
would be costs to the bank if it did sight review or develop
other procedures.
Sections 4-110 and 3-103(a)(7) have brought Articles Three
and Four into the modern electronic age. Together with
sections 3-404, 3-405, 3-406, and 4-406, they have transformed
the issue of loss allocation to make the electronic leap economi-
cally feasible. The former Code weighed the costs of sight-
review procedures to detect forgeries against the losses
incurred from the payment of forged checks; in short, a loss
resulting from forgery generally was allocated to the banks.
In contrast, the revised Code relieves the banks from potential
liability for discontinuing sight review. The revised Code
departs from tradition by modifying the definition of "ordinary
care" and by introducing the comparative loss provisions.
Under the revised Code, the anticipated savings from electronic
presentment and, ultimately, a check truncation system, are
predetermined to exceed substantially the losses incurred by
the occasional payment of forged checks. Thus, banks are freed
agreement by the customer to take precautions to prevent forgery. These precautions
should be stated with specificity and should be subject to prior consumer review and
companion consumer legislation.
312. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) eliminates sight review without setting dollar amounts or
requiring the weighing of burdens and benefits. The bank practice itself establishes
ordinary care. See U.C.C. § 3-103(aX7) (1990); see also Ellis & Dow, supra note 68, at
57, 74 (concluding that the revisions are unsound and that state legislatures should not
adopt them).
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from liability for individual decisions in a new system that is
not paper-based. A loss-allocation policy that formerly was
concerned only with liability between a bank and its customer
has yielded to a broader policy that echoes the dominant theme
of all of the revisions to Articles Three and Four: the
conversion from a paper-based system to a technologically
advanced system for electronically processing checks.
VII. THE NEED FOR COMPANION
CONSUMER LEGISLATION
A. Section 4-406: The Customer's Obligations
Section 4-406 imposes on customers the duty to examine,
discover, and report to the bank any unauthorized payments
promptly, whether due to forgery, alteration, or unauthorized
signature.313 The customer must notify the bank promptly of
the relevant facts if the customer "should reasonably have
discovered the unauthorized payment."314 This new test
expands the scope of the customer's obligation from prompt
examination to prompt discovery and imports an objective
standard for discovery of the unauthorized payment.315 To
recover damages for a bank's negligent payment of a check,
the customer, if also negligent, must prove either that the bank
failed to exercise ordinary care and that the failure "substan-
tially contributed" to the loss, or that the bank did not pay the
item in good faith.316
313. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (1990); cf. U.C.C. § 4406(1) (1989) ("[Tlhe customer must
exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement and items to discover
his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an item and must notify the bank
promptly after discovery thereof."). Section 4-406 bears the caption, "Customer's Duty
to Discover and Report Unauthorized Signature or Alteration.' The bank's obligations,
such as they are, also are included in § 4-406. U.C.C. § 4-406 (1990). The one-sidedness
of the caption calls to mind the reference to the Code as the "lawyers and bankers relief
act" when it first was introduced in 1953. See Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield
to Story toLlewellynandMentschikoff The Progressive Development of Commercial Law,
37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 351, 372 (1983).
314. U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (1990).
315. Compare id withU.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989). The time period forreview, however,
was increased from a "reasonable period not exceeding fourteen calendar days" to a
reasonable period not exceeding 30 days. Compare U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(b) (1989) with U.C.C.
§ 4-406(dX2) (1990).
316. U.C.C. § 4-406(d), (e) (1990). If the customer fails to take action within one year
after the bank statement or checks are "made available," the customer is precluded from
asserting the bank's negligence. Id § 4-406(0.
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B. A Safe Harbor for Banks: Section 4-406(a)
Neither former nor revised section 4-406 requires a bank
to return the customer's checks.317 But the former Code
requires the bank to make the statement and checks available
to the customer. 318 Under the revised Code, the bank satisfies
its obligation to the customer if it merely "provide[s] informa-
tion in the statement of account sufficient to allow the customer
reasonably to identify the items paid."319 Revised section 4-
406(a) establishes the bank's nonnegligence per se 320 by
conclusively limiting the bank's obligation to provide
information: "The statement of account provides sufficient
information if the item is described by item number, amount,
and date of payment."321 This major change facilitates the
transition to an electronic system and true check truncation,
where there will be no paper checks to return.
1. The Sufficiency Standard Is Flawed-This standard
of sufficiency is flawed because it only requires banks to
provide information to customers to enable them "to identify
the items paid." Customers should be entitled to enough infor-
mation to comply fully with all of their obligations under
revised section 4-406 to avoid liability. A customer not only
must identify the items, but also must "determine whether any
payment was not authorized because of an alteration of an item
or because a purported signature by or on behalf of the
customer was not authorized. "322 Banks therefore should be
required to provide more information than would enable
customers merely to "identify the items paid."
3 23
2. Information Is Not Sufficient-What needs do paper
checks satisfy? A check may evidence the payment of an
317. I& § 4-406(a); U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989).
318. U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1989).
319. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (1990).
320. This phrase borrows the concept from the tort phrase "negligence per se" by which
the negligence of a defendant is established from the defendant's violation of a statute.
See, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889). In the case of revised § 4-
406(a), the nonnegligence of the bank is established by the bank's compliance with the
statute. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (1990).
321. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (1990). This provision states the "safe-harbor rule.' Id. § 4-
406(a) cmt. 1. Comment 1 to § 4-406 interprets § 4-406(c) asnot triggering the preclusion
under § 4-406 if the customer could not "reasonably" have discovered the unauthorized
payment from the information provided by the bank in lieu of the check. See icL
322. Id § 4.406(c).
323. Even this obligation is elastic: the information must only be "sufficient to allow
the customer reasonably to identify the items paid." Id. § 4-406(a).
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obligation to a particular person of a specific monetary amount.
A check may prove the existence of a contract. It may satisfy
the Internal Revenue Service or other taxing authority,
governmental bureau, or licensing body. A check may trigger
an accord and satisfaction or otherwise settle a legal dispute.
The return of a paid check may simply serve a person's need
to be reassured.
Inspection of an original check may reveal a forgery or
alteration. It offers proof of an authorized payment or, if the
instrument is incomplete, shows evidence of having been
tampered with, proof of unauthorized payment. A check will
reveal whether all of the required signatures appear on the
check and how the check was indorsed. Even if a customer
agrees to participate in a check truncation or check retention
plan, the customer still may need to see one or more checks
for litigation or other purpose. 32 Handwriting experts
frequently require the original check in order to be able to give
an opinion as to its authenticity.3" The check provides a paper
trail of its travels through the banking system.
As long as the checks themselves are made available, all of
these needs can be satisfied. When checks are not routinely
available, customers must have adequate substitute informa-
tion. Customers must have enough information to reconcile
their own records. The name of the payee, the amount of the
check, the date of the check, and the check number should
satisfy most needs for information. In certain instances, it
would be useful also to have a record of the date of payment.
Revised section 4-406(a), however, does not require a bank
to supply the customer with the name of the payee or with the
date of the check. It requires only that the bank provide the
customer with "sufficient information," which it defines as the
"item number, amount, and date of payment."32 This clearly
is not sufficient information. Even a careful customer will not
be able to determine whether the intended payee cashed the
check, whether all the proper signatures were provided, or
whether the check had been altered.327 The date of the payment
will not identify the check because the customer's records will
324. See id. § 4-406 cmts. 1-2.
325. See Weinberg, supra note 104, at 580.
326. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (1990).
327. A drawer of the check may require the signature of two authorized employees
to negotiate the check properly. If only one of the two have signed and the account is
debited, the drawer will have no way of knowing whether the second signature was
obtained at all, or was by the proper person, if the physical check or an image thereof
is not returned.
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indicate the date on which the check is drawn, not the date
on which it is paid. If the check number has been altered, the
customer will not be able to correlate the information with her
own records.
Contrary to claims by banking industry representatives, the
technology does exist to provide additional information to
customers.3 2 Because revised section 4-406(a) protects banks
by locking into current technology, it already is anachronistic.
The safe-harbor rule, which defines legal sufficiency, removes
any legal incentive or obligation to develop new technology
to improve the information flow to ordinary customers.'s The
final sentence of section 4-406(a) of the revised Code therefore
either should be amended to include the additional information
that the customer needs or should be deleted to encourage
responsiveness to the customer's needs.
3. Legislative Alternatives to the Safe-Harbor
Provision-Serious concern already has been voiced in state
legislatures over the safe-harbor provision, which enables
banks to provide minimal information to customers without
fear of liability. Drastic alternatives have been suggested to
the legislatures in Michigan and in New York: either exempt
the transactions involving consumer checking accounts from
Article Four ° or refuse to adopt Article Four.3 1
328. Banking industry representatives persuaded the drafters of revised § 4-406 that
the banking industry did not have the technology to provide more information than the
item number, amount, and date of payment. Telephone Interview with Professor Robert
L. Jordan, Co-Reporter and drafter for revised Articles Three and Four (June 2, 1991);
see also U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 1 (1990) (stating thatthe provision in subsection (a) regarding
sufficient information was "based upon the existing state of technology" and was chosen
because it can be obtained by the bank's computer from the check's MICR line without
examination of the items involved"). In early 1992, however, some banks began to offer
image statements, which provide compressed images of checks, instead of returning
cancelled checks to customers. Carreker, supra note 93, at 22. Resistance is due to
expense and to the data-storage requirements involved in transmitting an image of an
entire check, which are 300 times more than transmitting only MICR data. Id at 28.
329. The issue of 'legal sufficiency" has been debated for four decades and is not
confinedto Articles Three orFour. See, e.g.,JuliannaJ. Zekan, TheName Game-Playing
to Win Under Section 9-402 of the Code, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 365 (1990) (discussing the
legal sufficiency of a financing statement under § 9-402).
330. Professor Edward L. Rubin suggested that this exemption, which he proposed,
could be accomplished by a provision stating that the "Article does not apply to accounts
owned by a natural person.* Letter from Prof. Edward L. Rubin, University of California
School of Law (Boalt Hall) and former chair of the ABA's Ad Hoc Committee on the
Payment System, to United States Representative John Bennett, Chairman House
Corporations and Finance Committee (Mar. 24, 1992) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
331. Id. Professor Rubin observed that the check collection system already was
governed by federal statute and would not be disrupted by failing to enact Article Four,
that loss allocation provisions do not need to be uniform throughout the country, and
that "f[a]doption of the revisions by every state will simply establish the same
disadvantageous terms for consumers throughout the U.S., rather than achieving
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The New York State Banking Law Committee recommended
that New York delete the definition of "sufficient informa-
tion." 332 This change would motivate banks to develop cost-
effective technology and to offer more information on the
statement of account, and would restore to the customer the
ability to challenge whether the bank exercised ordinary care
with respect to the information it provides on the bank
statement.
The California legislature retained the safe-harbor provision
but added a five-year sunset provision to section 4-406 which
will compel banks or other interested persons to prove why
it is not technologically appropriate to provide more informa-
tion than the item number, amount, and date of payment.&
a
In addition, California law entitles consumers to copies of two
checks at no charge for each statement period and requires
each bank statement to contain a telephone number which the
consumer may call for a copy of the check.'
The California modification offers greater certainty to banks
in the short-term and also is a good compromise.& It provides
transitional protection to banks which otherwise may be
reluctant to convert fully to electronic processing of checks.
The fundamental assumption, that the technology is not
uniformity in the collection process." Id. at 2-3.
332. Report from the New York State Bar Association Banking Law Committee,
Comments of Working Group to Proposed Revisions to Article 3 and 4 of the New York
Uniform Commercial Code 16 (May 6, 1992). The Working Group recommended that
the statute be enacted "only after consideration of consumer protection issues on an overall
basis." I&
333. See CAL. COM. CODE § 4-406 (West Supp. 1993). The safe-harbor provision will
expire afterJanuary 1,1998. 1& § 4-406(g); see also Memorandum from Gail Hillebrand,
Counsel to Consumers Union (California), Changes Made to Proposed Uniform Articles
3 and 4 by California Legislators as a Condition of Passage- (Sept. 9, 1992).
334. CAL. COM. CODE § 4-406(a), (b) (West Supp. 1993).
335. The California compromise also emphasized banks' obligations to act in good
faith. Interview with Gail Hillebrand, Counsel to Consumers Union (California), in San
Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 7, 1993); see also U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990) (defining good faith).
But see U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 4 (1990) (stating that "Itihe connotation of this [good-faith]
standard is fairness and not absence of negligence"). The emphasis on good faith as a
regulator of bank conduct may not be sufficient. As Professor Rubin pointed out, although
a significant number or even a majority of banks treat individual consumers with as
much deference as their corporate customers, 'there are also a significant number of
banks which are much less scrupulous about consumer interests, and some which are
truly negligent or oppressive. One reason for adopting protective legislation is to bring
this latter group into line. The existence of highly reputable practices by some banks
should be a guide to legislation that would make such practices obligatory, not an
argument for letting all banks act as they please." Letter from Prof. Edward L. Rubin,
supra note 330, at 4.
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available or is too expensive, is subject to review in five years
under the California sunset provision. By mandating a
procedure to reassess fundamental assumptions in light of legal
or economic developments, the California modification curbs
the impact of institutionalized resistance to a changing
technology.
C. Revisions and Further Recommendations
Perhaps all of section 4-406 should be referred to as the
banks' "safe-harbor" provision because it provides banks with
latitude in defining the scope of their obligations. To a large
degree, this flexibility is desirable because it allows the system
to evolve as technology develops and as needs are identified.
Protecting banks with a degree of certainty during the course
of transition is important, but it does not necessitate ignoring
consumers. Rather, the Code implicitly recognizes the need
for consumer legislation where the needs of the system conflict
with the needs of the individual user.'
For example, section 4-406 does not require a bank to furnish
or to retain the original checks; it need only "maintain the
capacity to furnish legible copies." " The Code thus leaves open
to debate whether a bank's obligation to a customer is dis-
charged simply by "maintain[ing] the capacity to furnish legible
copies" even if, in a given instance, the bank is unable to
provide the customer with the original check or a legible copy.
If so, the customer may be left with neither the original check,
nor a legible copy, nor an adequate remedy.
Revised section 4-406(b) allows a bank to supply a legible
copy of the check if it is destroyed "or is not otherwise
obtainable."' But when is a check"not otherwise obtainable?"
A bank should not be allowed to escape its obligation to provide
the actual check on the assertion that it is too costly or too
inconvenient to retrieve it and the check is therefore "not
obtainable." If the check has been destroyed inadvertently,
cannot be reproduced electronically, or is unobtainable for other
336. Comment 3 to § 4-110 states that "[tihe parties affected by an agreement for
electronic presentment, with the exception of the customer, can be expected to protect
themselves." U.C.C. § 4-110 cmt. 3 (1990) (emphasis added).
337. Id. § 4-406(b). No standards have yet been set for legibility.
338. Id.
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reasons, the customer should be compensated. Consumer
legislation should protect customers from a potentially
arbitrary interpretation of this provision and should describe
the circumstances in which the original check, a copy, or an
image of the check will be provided. 9
Revised section 4-406(b) also allows checks to be destroyed
even without a minimum holding period. ° A bank should be
required to retain the original check for at least a minimum
time period to enable an attentive consumer to discover
irregularities promptly and to obtain the original check. The
minimum time period, which should begin only after the
statement has been provided to the customer, should consist
of at least sixty days. Until the electronic system is fully
operational under the revised Code and the risks and losses
are reassessed, legislation may be necessary to require that
checks be stored for the statutory period within which an action
may be brought concerning the check.
Revised section 4-406 does not contemplate remedies for a
bank's failure to comply with obligations other than those
related to the bank's unauthorized payment of a check. A
bank's failure or inability to provide a customer with the
original check or with legible copies, for example, may cause
substantial loss to the customer. Companion legislation should
specify the remedies available to the customer for various types
of bank noncompliance, and should create dispute-resolution
procedures which will give the customer a realistic opportunity
to recover its loss. Optimally, public education programs"'
can educate attorneys, bankers, and especially consumers about
their respective responsibilities under the new system.
The Official Texts of Uniform State Laws, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code, typically do not set fees.' Accordingly, bank
fees for storing or retrieving checks, producing legible copies,
or for any other services are omitted from Articles Three and
Four. Maximum fees and other charges also may be appropri-
ately regulated by such legislation.
339. Such legislation or implementing regulations also should articulate the standards
for the quality of the copies.
340. Section 4-406 provides that [i]f the items are not returned to the customer, the
person retaining the items shall either retain the items or, if the items are destroyed,
maintain the capacity to furnish legible copies of the items until the expiration of seven
years after receipt of the items." U.C.C. § 4-406(b) (1990).
341. These programs could be sponsored by banks, bar associations, consumers unions,
law firms, government agencies, or other interested organizations.
342. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 2 (1990) (leaving it to the bank to set fees).
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The advent of an electronic system of processing checks and
eventual check truncation introduces additional persons to the
bank-customer relationship. For example, revised section 4-406
refers to "the person retaining the items," and imposes various
obligations on that person.3 Yet the "person" holding the
check or maintaining the capacity to produce copies is not likely
to have an established relationship or direct contract with the
bank's customer. What incentives exist to make such a person
responsive to the customer's request for a check or legible copy?
A Task Force of banking and consumer representatives could
develop procedures to facilitate prompt responses to consumer
requests.
Revised section 4-406(b) creates potential causes of action
against persons other than banks.3' The person who holds
the checks has access to the customer's financial and other
personal information. Consumers have come to expect privacy
and confidentiality from their banks. What is the liability of
a "person" who has custody of the checks or of the information
abstracted from the checks for wrongful disclosure, inadvertent
mistake, or other infraction of a perceived fiduciary responsi-
bility?345 What is the liability for improper or premature
destruction of checks or electronically stored information? If
companion legislation does not materialize to inform the
providers of their obligations, protect consumers, fashion
remedies, and establish procedures for dispute resolution,
consumers may face expensive legal battles in court or be
forced, as a practical matter, to absorb the losses.
CONCLUSION
The success of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions that
introduce comparative negligence, modify the standard of
ordinary care, and authorize check truncation rely in great
measure on the ability of customers to meet their increased
obligations under section 4-406 to examine, detect, and report
a forgery or other alteration of the check promptly. But the
343. Id. § 4-406(b).
344. According to the Code, "[a] 'person' includes an individual or an organization."
Id. § 1-201(29).
345. For an interesting introduction to the conflict of interest a bank may have with
respect to the disclosure or nondisclosure of confidential information by a bank to its
customer, see Ronald L Hersbergen, Banking Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 247, 264-65 (1983).
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ability of the customer to meet these obligations depends upon
the availability of the checks or upon the completeness and
accuracy of the information provided to the customer in lieu
of the checks.
Banks are protected against a claim of negligence in the very
area that most directly will lead to losses to customers: forged
or altered checks. Revised Articles Three and Four do not
obligate banks to develop alternative procedures to sight
review, nor are banks required to develop equivalent proce-
dures to detect MICR fraud. To the contrary, the Code
institutionalized its protection of banks through section 3-
103(aX7), which defines "ordinary care," and by the safe-harbor
rule of section 4-406(a).
Section 3-107(a)(3) does not link the elimination of sight-
review procedures to economic costs, to the dollar value of
losses, to the frequency of forgery occurrences, to the obsoles-
cence of paper checks, or to the introduction of check trunca-
tion. It does not provide any interim standard during the
transition from paper-based to an electronic-based system of
banking. The new standard of ordinary care to be applied to
banks by section 3-107(a)(7) does not require banks to
implement any alternative method of forgery detection, nor
does it require banks to develop forgery detection procedures
when presentment of checks is made through electronic signals
rather than by the transmission of paper checks. Because the
revisions institutionally protect the banks from resuming any
active role to detect forgery, the revised Code in effect places
the entire responsibility for detecting forgery on the customer,
who will have a difficult time detecting it.
The comparative negligence scheme, therefore, should be
adjusted to truly distribute losses among negligent parties. 3 '
Accordingly, a standard of care should be reintroduced to the
definition of "ordinary care," and banks should not be guaran-
teed statutory protection against losses resulting from the
elimination of all sight-review procedures, even if the customer
is negligent. Customers should be encouraged to exercise
ordinary care, but they should not be burdened with excessive
losses that are not truly related to their degree of negligence.
At the very least, while the public becomes informed of the
changes and their increased responsibilities, transition
346. Resistance to modifying the revisions before their enactment by the states is
likely to be encountered due to the serious need for uniformity of bank legislation. See
Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4, and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 405, 412-16 (1991).
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provisions should be established while sight review gradually
is eliminated. In addition, banks should be required to develop
procedures to detect MICR fraud and other types of electronic
fraud. Moreover, each bank or association of banks should
establish procedures to review customer grievances, to settle
disputes cooperatively and fairly, and to avoid the expense and
time of litigation.
Finally, the success of the system envisioned by revised
Articles Three and Four depends upon an educated public.
Customers should be informed that banks no longer will
undertake the same responsibilities as under the former Code,
and that customers will be expected to assume more responsi-
bility with respect to their checks in order to avoid liability.
The transformation from the paper age to the electronic era
may require more prudent behavior and ultimately mayj ustify
a redistribution of loss. Comparative negligence should not
mean, however, that negligent banks are protected against
negligent customers.
